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DECONFOUNDING AND SANDBOXING PATENT LITIGATION
WITH A SPECIALIZED PATENT TRIAL COURT
JEREMY W. BOCK*
ABSTRACT
According to a recent study, patent litigation has been the target of
multiple reform efforts over the past several decades, with mixed results that
have left its fundamental dynamics—and problems—stubbornly intact. To
make patent litigation more amenable to diagnosis and treatment, this Article
proposes setting up a single, specialized Article III patent trial court that has
exclusive original jurisdiction over patent cases and is empowered to
promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure. Although the suggestion
to set up a specialized patent trial court is not new, the existing rationales for
doing so focus primarily on enhancing the quality of adjudication and
eliminating forum shopping. But the literature has overlooked other
potential benefits of such a court. Specifically, it can provide a controlled
environment that could: (1) improve the ability of judges and policymakers
to diagnose problems in patent litigation by removing certain variables,
keeping other variables constant, or mitigating their variance, thereby
decreasing the number and influence of potential confounders; and (2) allow
for “sandboxing,” which can facilitate the adoption of reforms and expand
the universe of solutions because the impact of a change that could materially
alter the dynamics of patent litigation (and the risk of failure) may remain
localized without affecting other parts of the federal court system or raise
trans-substantivity concerns. More importantly, the controlled environment
provided by a specialized trial court may make it easier to have an iterative
diagnosis-treatment cycle, which is necessary for a complex system (like
patent litigation) where the initial attempt at diagnosis or reform is unlikely
to yield a definitive answer or a lasting solution. It is expected that the
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diagnostic and reform-facilitating benefits of a specialized trial court—when
aggregated with the other theorized benefits of specialized courts suggested
in the literature—could outweigh the potential downsides, such as a lack of
percolation, susceptibility to capture, and tunnel vision from the loss of the
generalist perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
Here’s a puzzle: the patent system has been resilient to changes in the
law over the past four decades.1 Changes in the law—whether statutory,
decisional, procedural, or substantive—have failed to materially alter the
fundamental dynamics of patent assertion.2 Complaints about forum
shopping, unpredictability, and abusive patent assertions have persisted
largely unabated.3 Given the perennial attempts at reform,4 such resistance
1. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–6
(2016) [hereinafter Lemley, Resilience].
2. Id. at 2 (“[T]he data show very little evidence that patent owners and challengers are
behaving differently because of changes in the law.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
https://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patentreform-legislation/ (last updated Dec. 4, 2019).
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to change is a mystery that warrants greater attention. There may be a variety
of reasons why some change in the law fails to have the intended impact or
is otherwise ineffective in materially changing patent litigation. It may be
the case that, in response to a major change in the law affecting some aspect
of patent litigation, its participants shift their strategies, select more
hospitable fora, or otherwise respond in a manner that maintains a certain
homeostatic set point.5 Or, maybe the change in the law targets the symptom
rather than the underlying cause. Another possibility is that the change in the
law is difficult to apply or was unartfully drafted. Or, perhaps, the change in
the law had very little practical impact because it did not go far enough or
was limited in scope due to opposition by interest groups or other
considerations, such as trans-substantivity6 in the Federal Rules.
On the rare occasion that Congress enacts legislation to reform patent
litigation,7 passing a law that is ultimately ineffective is a costly, wasted
opportunity. The same concern applies to the correction of patent law
precedents by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—
which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases8—because en
banc decisions are rare.9 Grants of certiorari by the Supreme Court are rarer
still.10 If changes in the law and reforms are not yielding lasting, material
improvements, a threshold question that arises is whether we are accurately
diagnosing what is wrong. The literature contains a plethora of theories about
how and why certain problems exist in patent litigation and suggestions for
solving them.11 For example, some of the more popular explanations for the
problem of abusive patent assertions include: the high cost of patent

5. Lemley, Resilience, supra note 1, at 31 (“Changes that move patent law in one direction
can produce complex feedback effects that return the system to equilibrium.”).
6. “A procedural rule is trans-substantive if it applies equally to all cases regardless of
substance. . . . The vast majority of the Federal Rules are trans-substantive, with a few minor
exceptions.” David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) (footnote omitted).
7. See John Lauritsen, Good Question: Why Is It So Hard To Pass A Law?, CBS MINNESOTA
(June 23, 2016 10:56 PM), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/good-question-passingbills/ (“During this session of Congress, only 2 percent of bills introduced have become law.”).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
9. According to one estimate, the Federal Circuit issued en banc opinions in patent cases
approximately 0.3% of the time from 1982 to 2010. Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative
Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 736–38 (2011).
10. The
Supreme
Court
at
Work,
SUP.
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx (last visited June 18, 2021) (“Plenary
review, with oral arguments by attorneys, is currently granted in about 80 . . . cases each
Term . . . .”).
11. See infra Part I.
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litigation, suboptimal substantive patent law, poor patent quality,
unpredictable outcomes, and forum shopping.12
However, it is difficult to figure out which problems are the actual
underlying causes rather than the symptoms, and whether a proposed reform
or a change in precedent will have a material impact. Given the complexity
of patent litigation, accurate diagnosis can be difficult because of possible
confounders or other factors that can obscure the source of the problem.
Misdiagnoses may lead to ineffective procedural reforms that are prone to
circumvention13 (e.g., the joinder rule for patent cases).14 With other
problems (e.g., claim construction), it may be difficult to ascertain the extent
to which the problem is attributable to the characteristics of the trial judge,15
the applicable law (e.g., suboptimal doctrines, standard of review), something
else, or some combination thereof.
But even if an accurate diagnosis were possible, the sheer number of
moving parts and the complexity of patent litigation can introduce inertia and
resistance to taking action. The lobbying efforts of different stakeholders and
interest groups within the patent system (e.g., high-tech, big pharma) can
make it difficult to enact new legislation.16 In addition, because patent
litigation is conducted in generalist federal courts, concerns about collateral
damage beyond the patent system (e.g., impacts on other types of litigation
and trans-substantivity in the Federal Rules) can stymie change or limit the
scope of any changes that are adopted.17 And even if a change in the law
were to occur without it being limited or watered down, the complexity of
the patent system may make it difficult to accurately predict whether the
change will be effective or work as intended; there is a good chance that the
initial solution may fall short in some way.
To enhance diagnostic power and facilitate material change in the
dynamics of patent litigation, one option that has evaded meaningful
consideration in the literature is to create a controlled environment in which
the number and magnitude of possible confounders are reduced, and the
barriers to adopting—and iterating—solutions are lowered. For any complex
system—whether it be patent litigation or the human body—diagnosis and
treatment are necessarily iterative processes. The initial diagnosis of a
complex system may often be incomplete, such that the treatments may need

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.A.2.
35 U.S.C. § 299.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
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to be refined or changed, which may, in turn, yield more refined diagnoses
and treatments in an iterative fashion.
For patent litigation, one way to implement such a controlled
environment would be to establish a single, specialized Article III patent trial
court that has exclusive original jurisdiction over patent cases and is
empowered to promulgate its own rules of practice. This specialized trial
court may mitigate diagnostic confounders arising from variations in: (1)
patent litigation procedure (whereby the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) and the current patchwork of patent local rules18 in multiple district
courts would be replaced by a single set of procedural rules tailored to patent
cases); (2) venue (whereby litigants will be unable to evade reforms by forum
shopping, and, by removing the need for forum selling, judge-to-judge
variance in case management practices may decrease); and (3) trial judge
experience (whereby all the judges of the specialized trial court will be (or
become) highly experienced in patent case adjudication).
The controlled environment of a specialized patent trial court can
improve diagnosis by removing certain variables, keeping some variables
constant, and/or mitigating their variance. And once a diagnosis is obtained,
the standalone nature of the proposed patent trial court may facilitate the
adoption of reforms or changes to the law because the impact of the changes
and the risk of a potential failure may remain localized to patent cases, rather
than spreading to or affecting other litigation in the federal court system.
That is, the specialized patent trial court would operate as a “sandbox”19 that
would allow iterative diagnosis and treatment cycles to occur more readily
than is possible today. A specialized patent trial court may thus encourage
(or, at the very least, permit) more experimentation with patent litigation
procedure—whether by the patent trial court itself, the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court, or Congress. In addition, the proposed patent trial court
would be empowered to promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure.
This is an important feature for facilitating iterative changes to the rules
governing patent litigation, because the rule changes could be adopted by the
patent trial court itself without having to go through the Judicial Conference
18. See Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 87
(2015) [hereinafter La Belle, Local Rules] (“[T]hirty district courts in twenty different states have
exercised the discretion granted by FRCP 83 and adopted comprehensive local patent rules.”); see
also id. at 87 n.175 (listing districts). The terms “patent local rules” and “local patent rules” are
interchangeable, and both are used by courts to refer to a special set of local rules for patent cases.
See, e.g., Patent Local Rules, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL. (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/rules/patent-local-rules/ [hereinafter N.D. Cal. Patent Rules]; Local
Patent Rules, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST. OF OHIO, https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/localpatent-rules (last visited June 18, 2021). The present Article uses the term “patent local rules”
throughout.
19. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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or wait for an act of Congress, which can take years and lead to changes being
held up or watered down due to lobbying by stakeholders both within and
outside the patent system.20
Although several major economies around the world already have
specialized courts of first instance for patent disputes,21 the idea of setting up
a specialized patent trial court has thus far failed to gain traction in the United
States. In the literature, the primary justifications for setting up such a court
have focused primarily on improving the quality of adjudication22 and
eliminating forum shopping at the trial-court level.23 What has been largely
overlooked in the literature on specialized courts is that specialization can
serve as a tool for facilitating diagnosis and reform because it provides an
opportunity to create a controlled environment. Whenever specialized courts
are proposed, some of the more common concerns voiced by commentators
include the lack of percolation, susceptibility to capture, and “tunnel vision”
from the loss of the generalist perspective.24 Although greater specialization
might create additional problems, the benefits are likely to outweigh the
potential downsides when the diagnostic and reform-facilitating effects are
aggregated with the other benefits of specialized courts that have been
previously identified in the literature.25
The benefits of a controlled environment provided by a suitably
designed, specialized court are not limited to patent litigation. Its principles
may be adapted to other areas of the law where there is a need to reduce the
number of variables and moving parts in order to make it easier to: (1) figure
out what is wrong; (2) craft appropriate reforms or changes in the law
(whether statutory or decisional law); and (3) iterate as necessary.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the diagnostic
difficulties associated with patent reform. Part II explains how a controlled
environment, in the form of a specialized Article III patent trial court, can
ameliorate the difficulties with diagnosing and treating problems in patent
litigation. Part III addresses potential concerns and objections to the proposal
and is followed by the Conclusion.
20. See infra notes 230‒245 and accompanying text.
21. Countries that have specialized trial courts for patent litigation include Japan, see Yoshiyuki
Inaba, Hiroshi Nemoto, Makoto Okada & Atsushi Sato, Japan: Patent Litigation, THE LEGAL 500,
https://www.legal500.com/guides/chapter/japan-patent-litigation/ (last visited June 18, 2021), and
the United Kingdom, see Matthew Bultman, What You Need To Know About Patent Litigation In
The UK, LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2018, 8:34 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1070615/whatyou-need-to-know-about-patent-litigation-in-the-uk.
22. See infra notes 252‒262 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part III; see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32‒41
(John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2011) (discussing effects of specialization).
25. See infra notes 83, 253, 256, 262 and accompanying text.
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I. THE SISYPHEAN NATURE OF PATENT REFORM
The United States patent system has undergone several major
reconfigurations since its creation in the eighteenth century.26 The current
iteration of the patent system emerged in 1982 with the creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.27 Vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases,28 the Federal Circuit was created
with the expectation that it “will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law,
will make litigation results more predictable and will eliminate the expensive
and time-consuming forum shopping that currently characterizes litigation in
the field.”29
In furtherance of these goals, the Federal Circuit issues around 120
patent-related precedents per year,30 which are periodically modified,
abrogated, and supplemented by en banc rehearings, Supreme Court case
law, and acts of Congress. The changes have affected both substantive patent
law and patent litigation procedure, including: liability issues (e.g., claim
construction,31 obviousness,32 patentable subject matter33); remedies (e.g.,
injunctions,34 damages,35 willfulness,36 attorney fee awards37); procedural

26. The first patent statute was passed in 1790 by the First Congress. An Act to promote the
progress of useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
27. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
29. THE NINTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS, 94 F.R.D. 347, 358 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
30. See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Statistics–2020 edition, at figs.4 & 5, PATENTLY-O
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/01/federal-circuit-statistics.html.
31. E.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogated in part by Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
32. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
33. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
34. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
35. E.g., WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018); Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
36. E.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); In re Seagate Tech.,
LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated by Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928; Underwater
Devices Inc. v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (1983), overruled by Seagate, 497 F.3d at
1365.
37. E.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 548 (2014)
(abrogating Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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issues (e.g., declaratory judgment jurisdiction,38 joinder of parties,39 venue40);
and proceedings at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
(e.g., Inter Partes Review41).
However, as observed by Mark Lemley, the patent system has exhibited
a puzzling resilience in spite of these changes, whereby the fundamental
dynamics pertaining to the procurement and assertion of patents have not
materially changed in recent decades.42 Indeed, it has long been “business as
usual”: the rate of patent issuance has steadily increased from fewer than
60,000 per year in the early 1980s to around 300,000 per year in 2015,43 and
the number of patent suits filed per year have more than tripled from 1982 to
2010.44 At the same time, patent quality has not substantially improved in
the past four decades; patents are still invalidated almost half of the time in
court.45 Also, the patentee win rate in litigation has remained static at around
25%.46 Notably, concerns about abusive patent assertions have not abated.
Of particular concern are suits filed by patent assertion entities (“PAEs”)—
colloquially known as “patent trolls”—which have been the focus of multiple
studies by the Federal Trade Commission since 2003,47 numerous patent
reform bills in recent decades,48 and various reforms enacted in the 2011
38. E.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
39. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(d), 125 Stat. 284, 332–33
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299).
40. E.g., TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017)
(overruling VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
41. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299–304
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
42. Lemley, Resilience, supra note 1, at 1–6.
43. See column titled “Utility Patent Grants, All Origin Total” in U.S. Patent Statistics Chart
Calendar
Years
1963–2020,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited June 18, 2021).
44. See Gene Quinn, The Rise of Patent Litigation in America: 1980–2012, IP WATCHDOG
(Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/09/the-rise-of-patent-litigation-in-america1980-2012/id=38910/.
45. See Lemley, Resilience, supra note 1, at 24 (summarizing results of three empirical studies
indicating that, across several decades, patents litigated to a final decision in federal court on validity
issues were upheld between 54% to 58% of the time).
46. Id. at 25 (“In 2006, Paul Janicke and LiLan Ren found that patentees won 25% of all cases
decided between 2002 and 2004. A decade later, Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz found that
patentees won 26% of cases filed in 2008 and 2009 and litigated to decision on validity between
2009 and 2013.” (footnote omitted)).
47. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study; FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND P ATENT LAW
AND POLICY (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competitionpatent-law-policy.
48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

2021]

DECONFOUNDING AND SANDBOXING PATENT LITIGATION

1145

America Invents Act (“AIA”).49 Complaints about abusive assertions
continue to drive ongoing attempts at patent reform, as demonstrated most
recently in the June 2019 congressional hearings on proposals to overhaul the
patentable subject matter requirement.50 Finally, the original problems that
led to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 still have not fully subsided.
“Uniformity” in patent law has been achieved in a superficial sense by virtue
of having a single appellate court for patent appeals that issues binding
precedent with nationwide effect. However, predictability in adjudication
and the elimination of expensive and time-consuming forum shopping still
remain elusive goals, as indicated by: complaints in recent decades about
high reversal rates;51 panel dependence in appellate outcomes;52 and the
concentration of patent suits in select jurisdictions that is symptomatic of
active forum shopping53 and forum selling54 at the district-court level.
If, despite numerous changes to statutory and decisional law, the same
complaints persist without material improvement, it may be an indication that
we have difficulty either diagnosing the problems with patent litigation, or
crafting a lasting solution, or both. Although it is estimated that, at most,
only about 2% of patents are litigated,55 much of the complaints, concerns,
and reforms relating to the patent system have focused on patent litigation,
for a couple of reasons.
First, patents are essentially a right to sue.56 Although patents are
obtained for a variety of reasons—such as signaling a firm’s economic
49. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
50. See, e.g., Jared B. Rifis, Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, George C. Beck & Gilberto M.
Villacorta, The State of Patent Eligibility–Report on Senate Hearings, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-patent-eligibility-report-senate-hearings.
51. See, e.g., Hon. Patti B. Saris, The Indefinite Role of the Trial Judge in Patent Litigation, 18
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2014) (“In 2010, the Federal Circuit reversed in full or in
part approximately 40% of patent infringement cases. In 2011, the Federal Circuit reversed at least
one term in about 30% of claim construction cases. . . . [This] far exceeds the 6.9% average rate of
reversal of the regional circuits.” (footnotes omitted)).
52. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2004) (presenting
data revealing that “the composition of the panel that hears and decides an appeal has a statistically
significant effect on the claim construction analysis”).
53. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001).
54. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).
55. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501
(2001).
56. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003)
(“What the patent grant actually gives the patentholder is the right to sue to prevent others from
infringing the patent. . . . [A] real patent does not give the patentee ‘the right to exclude’ but rather
the more limited ‘right to try to exclude’ by asserting its patent in court.”); see also Joseph Scott
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attributes,57 enhancing product marketing,58 or indicating a firm’s compliance
with industry norms59—a major driver of patenting is related to its potential
use in litigation for offensive and/or defensive purposes. Colleen Chien has
chronicled the arms race that led to the growth of large patent portfolios,
which were initially amassed for defensive purposes for use in
counterclaims.60 But those large portfolios, which are expensive to maintain,
became subject to a monetization push by operating companies that has
resulted in licensing campaigns (backed by the threat of litigation) and the
sale of patents to PAEs.61 Second, patent law is created and maintained
largely by the Federal Circuit. The PTO does not have substantive
rulemaking authority;62 its interpretations of the Patent Act relating to
substantive patent law are not accorded Chevron63 deference.64 Accordingly,
much of substantive patent law is decisional law created by the Federal
Circuit. Over 90% of patent cases settle at the trial level,65 leaving patent law

Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 667, 680 n.46 (2004) (“It is thus, in a sense, more accurate to say that a patent confers a
right to sue, rather than a right to exclude.”).
57. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 651–52 (2002) (“Straight patent
counts are used as a means of measuring otherwise unobservable or difficult-to-measure attributes,
such as knowledge capital or the productivity of R&D spending. Analysts often treat patents as a
benchmark of firm innovativeness.” (footnote omitted)).
58. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for
A New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 1, 3–5 (2000).
59. See Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 442 (2016)
(“Patents serve as a token of . . . compliance [in the expected social order] because they are integral
to the pervasive narrative of innovation . . . . The firm may or may not in fact be innovative . . . but
that is largely beside the point: holding patents demonstrates its adoption of the proper role in the
proper social script.”).
60. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010).
61. Id. at 304–07.
62. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he broadest of
the PTO’s rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT grant the
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.” (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
63. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842‒44 (1984)
(providing a framework for according deference to an agency’s construction of a statute).
64. Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he [PTO’s] Board does not
earn Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law.”).
65. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities
of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2014) (“[L]ess than 10% of the patent
lawsuits filed in 2008 and 2009 (462 of 5,029) resulted in any merits decision. In other words, more
than 90% of lawsuits settle before the court resolves summary judgment or tries the case.” (footnote
omitted)).
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susceptible to being shaped by selection effects arising from those cases that
eventually secure an appellate disposition.
Given the importance of litigation and decisional law in shaping the
patent system, it should come as no surprise that they have been the focus of
many proposals for reform. For example, scholars have suggested various
procedural changes for patent suits to mitigate the problem of abusive
litigation, such as: restricting venue to prevent forum shopping and forum
selling;66 expanding the customer suit exception;67 requiring early-stage
administrative review of patent suits;68 and fee-shifting.69 Other proposals
have focused on improving the quality and predictability of adjudication at
the trial level by increasing the patent law expertise of federal district court
judges70 or creating a specialized patent trial court.71 With respect to fixing
substantive patent law precedents, much commentary exists on the need to
improve the doctrines governing claim construction,72 remedies (especially
reasonable royalties),73 and more recently, patentable subject matter.74 On a
more macroscopic level, oft-repeated criticisms of the Federal Circuit’s

66. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1447 (2010)
[hereinafter Fromer, Patentography]; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 304; Moore, supra note
53, at 931–37.
67. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit
Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1635–41 (2013).
68. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen, John M. Golden, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, “Troll”
Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1808
(2017).
69. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 795 (2002); Megan M. La Belle, Fee Shifting for PTAB Proceedings, 24 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 367, 399 (2016).
70. See infra Part II.D.2.
71. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for A Specialized Patent Trial
Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 443 (2011); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts:
Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 877–78 (2002) [hereinafter Rai,
Specialized Trial Courts].
72. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 nn.6–
11 (2013) (collecting sources).
73. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49
GA. L. REV. 79, 81–82, 82 n.6 (2014) (collecting sources).
74. See, e.g., Jason D. Reinecke, Is the Supreme Court’s Patentable Subject Matter Test Overly
Ambiguous? An Empirical Test, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 581, 582 (2019) (compiling scholarly
reactions).
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jurisprudence include its penchant for rigid, formalistic rules,75 and its
unwillingness to tailor patent law to the needs of different industries.76
Given the patent system’s historical resilience to changes in the law,77 it
may be unclear, at first blush, which, if any, of the existing proposals or areas
highlighted for improvement mentioned above should be the focus of reform
efforts. Because opportunities for change through congressional action, en
banc review at the Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court review are relatively
scarce,78 it would be wasteful to focus on the symptoms of a problem or
reform proposals that are unlikely to be effective. Unfortunately, the
complex machinery of patent litigation can obscure the underlying causes of
persistent problems, as well as limit the universe of feasible, lasting solutions.
A major source of complexity in patent litigation lies in the fact that patent
cases are currently adjudicated in federal district courts where there may be
considerable case-to-case, district-to-district, and judge-to-judge variances in
the adjudicatory environment. Further compounding the complexity is the
fact that the universe of patent litigants hail from different industries that
interact with the patent system in very different ways and have different
priorities. For example, patents are critical to the product development plans
of pharmaceutical companies,79 while software and electronics companies are
primarily concerned with fighting nuisance suits from “patent trolls.”80 As
such, different industries may employ different litigation strategies, and may
have different preferred venues.81 Thus, when it becomes necessary to
address a problem in patent litigation, it may be difficult to pinpoint or
disentangle the root cause of the problem, which can lead to a misdiagnosis,
which, in turn, may lead to an ineffective solution being adopted—sometimes
at considerable cost in light of the rarity of congressional action, Federal
Circuit en banc rulings, and Supreme Court review.
75. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and
Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 420 n.16 (2013) (collecting sources criticizing Federal Circuit
formalism).
76. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1579
(2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers]; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search
of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 827
(2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Identity].
77. Lemley, Resilience, supra note 1, at 2.
78. See supra notes 7‒10 and accompanying text.
79. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 547 (2009) (“[I]t is not unusual for a pharmaceutical company to sour on an otherwise
promising drug candidate after their attorneys turn up a prior disclosure that threatens its patent
protection.”).
80. See Edgar Walters, Tech Companies Fight Back Against Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/tech-companies-fight-back-against-patentlawsuits.html.
81. See infra notes 303–304 and accompanying text.
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II. PROPOSAL: A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT
One possible solution for overcoming the patent system’s resistance to
change may be to create a controlled environment for patent suits to reduce
the effect of possible diagnostic confounders and facilitate implementation
of impactful changes. As proposed in this Article, a controlled environment
can be implemented with a single, specialized patent trial court that has
exclusive original jurisdiction over patent suits and is empowered to
promulgate its own rules of practice. Concentrating all patent suits in a single
trial court that has its own rules of practice—separate from the Federal
Rules—may help mitigate confounders arising from variations in: (1) patent
litigation procedure (whereby the FRCP and the current patchwork of patent
local rules in multiple district courts would be replaced by a single set of
procedural rules tailored to patent cases); (2) venue (whereby litigants will
be unable to evade reforms by forum shopping, and, by removing the need
for forum selling, judge-to-judge variance in case management practices may
decrease); and (3) trial judge experience (whereby all the judges of the
specialized trial court will be (or become) highly experienced in patent case
adjudication).
To the extent that a specialized patent trial court has been previously
proposed in the literature, its justifications typically focused on enhancing
the quality of adjudication82 in patent cases and eliminating forum
shopping.83 What has been overlooked in the literature is the potential utility
of a specialized trial court to enhance diagnostic power by reducing the
number and magnitude of possible confounders, thereby allowing the
underlying cause of some intractable problem to be discerned more
accurately by judges, policymakers, stakeholders, and other observers of the
patent system. Indeed, the reduction of confounders will enhance empirical
research relating to patent litigation, given that substantial disagreement
exists over whether the current empirical literature supports the need for
additional reforms, as shown by the dueling set of letters from the academy
that was sent to Congress a couple of years after the enactment of the AIA.84

82. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The term “quality of adjudication” as used in
this Article refers to the “correctness” of decisions (often measured as a function of the reversal
rate) from the standpoint of substantive patent law and the specific technology at issue. The uniform
application of the law and the predictability of outcomes are also relevant considerations for the
quality of adjudication.
83. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 53, at 932‒33.
84. The letters are reproduced on the Patently-O website operated by Dennis Crouch. Compare
Dennis Crouch, The Rewards From Effective Reform Could Be Great, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 3, 2015),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/rewards-effective-reform.html
(signed
by
fifty-one
academics), with Dennis Crouch, Professor-to-Professor: You Are Wrong about Patent Reform,
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Furthermore, the controlled environment provided by a specialized
patent trial court may also help facilitate experimentation to test and finetune possible “treatments” in the form of changes to the law or reforms to
resolve some underlying problem. Specifically, policymakers and judges
may be able to introduce or try out new procedural rules without regard to
trans-substantivity concerns in federal litigation procedure. That is, the
specialized trial court may allow for “sandboxing,”85 whereby the impact of
any new procedural rules would be limited to patent cases without affecting
other litigation in the federal court system. In addition, because the proposed
patent trial court would be empowered to promulgate its own rules of practice
and procedure, it can readily refine the rules governing patent litigation in an
iterative manner to keep up with the litigants’ evolving strategies—without
going through the Judicial Conference or waiting for an act of Congress,
which can take years and lead to changes being held up or watered down due
to lobbying by stakeholders.86
This Part explains the diagnosis- and treatment-enhancing features of
the specialized trial court proposal in greater detail.
A. Enhancing Diagnoses by Mitigating Confounders
As proposed, a specialized patent trial court could mitigate diagnostic
confounders along at least three dimensions: (1) patent litigation procedure;
(2) venue; and (3) trial judge experience.
1. Patent Litigation Procedure
Presently, there are multiple sets of procedural rules that govern how a
patent case is litigated in any one of the ninety-four federal district courts:87
the FRCP; certain sections of Title 28 (e.g., the venue rule for patent cases88);
local rules governing civil cases;89 patent local rules (in several dozen district
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/professor-patent-reform.html
(signed by forty academics).
85. A definition of “sandboxing,” which has its origins in computer security, is as follows:
Sandboxing is a computer security term referring to when a program is set aside from
other programs in a separate environment so that if errors or security issues occur, those
issues will not spread to other areas on the computer. Programs are enabled in their own
sequestered area, where they can be worked on without posing any threat to other
programs.
Sandboxing, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/25266/sandboxing (last visited
June 19, 2021).
86. See infra Part II.B.
87. Court Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/courtrole-and-structure (last visited June 19, 2021) (noting that there are ninety-four district courts).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83.
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courts);90 precedents from the regional circuits on procedural issues that do
not implicate substantive patent law; 91 and Federal Circuit precedents on
procedural issues that are “intimately involved in the substance of
enforcement of the patent right.”92 On top of the district-to-district variance
in the set of rules (of which there will be ninety-four varieties), there will also
be judge-to-judge variance in how the rules are applied within a district
because some rules may be open to varying interpretations or require the
exercise of discretion.93
To reduce diagnostic confounders, the current amalgam of multiple sets
of procedural rules would be replaced with a single set of procedural rules
tailored to patent litigation for use by the proposed specialized patent trial
court. Other than high-level housekeeping issues related to the establishment
of the specialized patent trial court—such as the grant of powers, jurisdiction,
etc., which would be established by an act of Congress—this single set of
procedural rules governing practice and procedure in patent cases would be
promulgated by the specialized patent trial court itself. 94 This arrangement
is by no means unprecedented in the federal court system: examples of
specialized courts that craft their own procedural rules include the United
States Court of International Trade95 and the United States Tax Court.96
Given the complexity of patent litigation, the specialized patent trial court’s
ability to promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure is a critical
feature that allows for iterative diagnosis-treatment cycles. In promulgating
a single set of procedural rules, the proposed court will not eliminate all
potential confounders arising from procedural variations. Rather, it can
remove some (e.g., district-to-district variance in the procedural rules) while
decreasing the magnitude of others (e.g., judge-to-judge variance in the
exercise of discretion). Depending on the problem, it may not be necessary
(or feasible) to eliminate all confounders; simply mitigating one or more
confounders may be sufficient to enhance diagnostic accuracy.
Having only one set of procedural rules apply in an area of law as
complex as patent litigation is desirable because the interaction of multiple
sets of procedural rules can increase the probability of misdiagnosis in at least
two ways.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Rsch. Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Viam Corp. v. Iowa Exp.-Imp. Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 428 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
28 U.S.C. § 2633(b).
26 U.S.C. § 7453.
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First, having many sets of rules covering similar or related areas may
increase the likelihood of obscuring the source of the problem: Does the
problem lie with the FRCP? Or some patent local rule? Or with substantive
patent law? Or a combination? In addition, depending on who (e.g., trial
judges, appellate judges, Congress, academics, stakeholders, etc.) is
performing the diagnosis and their priors, there may be a tendency to focus
on one rule over another in an ambiguous situation. For example, a problem
that may appear on the surface to be attributable to some provision in the
FRCP might actually be rooted in one of the Federal Circuit’s precedents on
an issue of substantive patent law that is closely tied to procedural issues, for
which there may also be associated patent local rules.
By way of illustration, a misdiagnosis along these lines likely occurred
with the special joinder rule for patent cases enacted through the AIA, 35
U.S.C. § 299, which prohibits the mass joinder of unrelated defendants in a
single suit solely on the basis that they allegedly infringed the same patent.97
Section 299 can be readily circumvented when plaintiffs file multiple cases
and move to consolidate them. Because the statute, as drafted, limits
consolidations “for trial”98 and is silent on pretrial matters, some courts have
interpreted Section 299 as being inapplicable to pretrial consolidation and
have granted plaintiffs’ motions to consolidate,99 citing the need to avoid
construing the same patent more than once.100 The significance of trial vs.
pretrial consolidation appears to have eluded Congress, which seemingly
viewed the mass joinder problem as simply a “joinder” issue under FRCP
20,101 without appreciating its implications for claim construction, which is
usually a pretrial event102 that is often scheduled according to the patent local

97. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(d)(1), 125 Stat. 332 (2011)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 299).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 299(b).
99. See, e.g., Affinity Lab’ys of Tex., LLC v. Blackberry Ltd., No. WA:13-CV-362, 2014 WL
12551206, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2014) (“While it is clear that the limitations set out in the AIA
extends [sic] to consolidation of actions for trial, consolidation for pretrial proceedings is not
addressed in § 299.”); In re: Bear Creek Techs., Inc., (‘722) Pat. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2012) (“Section 299 . . . is silent as to the conduct of pretrial proceedings . . . .”).
100. See, e.g., Auto-Dril, Inc. v. Canrig Drilling Tech., Ltd., No. 6:15-CV-00096, 2015 WL
12780793, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 2015) (“Allowing the parties to present their evidence and
arguments concerning claims construction in a single hearing will help conserve judicial resources
by limiting the claim construction to a single hearing at which all parties are present, rather than
three separate hearings.”).
101. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II,
21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 539, 590–93 (2012) (summarizing legislative history of Section 299).
102. See Edward Tulin, Practical Strategies For Markman Hearings Amid COVID-19, LAW360
(May 15, 2020, 5:16 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1272814/practical-strategies-formarkman-hearings-amid-covid-19.
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rules,103 and which is considered one of the most significant events in a patent
case by virtue of its centrality to the merits104 and the de novo standard of
review on appeal.105
Such misdiagnoses should not be surprising in complex litigation.
Could the proposed specialized patent trial court have promulgated a joinder
rule with a similar flaw? It is possible, but the likelihood of a misdiagnosis
would decrease because the court would be operating under a single set of
procedural rules, which would be amended by its own judges who would be
highly experienced with, and thus attuned to, the interactions between the
procedural rules and substantive patent law. Compared to Congress, if the
proposed specialized patent trial court needed to amend a rule in response to
circumvention attempts, it can more readily do so on its own as it may be
more resistant to lobbying.
Second, diagnostic confounders may also be introduced by the
availability of different interpretations or versions of the same (or similar)
rule in different districts. For example, the interpretation of some federal
procedural statute or FRCP provision that is applied during a patent case may
differ from circuit to circuit because the Federal Circuit allows the law of the
regional circuit to be applied to procedural issues that do not implicate
substantive patent law.106 Relatedly, the patent local rules adopted by several
dozen district courts are not uniform, with some districts not having any
patent local rules.107 Such district-to-district variance in the procedural rules
can drive forum shopping and forum selling.108 The resulting nonrandom
distribution of patent cases among districts may limit the statistical power of
empirical studies that courts and policymakers rely on to diagnose problems
with patent litigation and devise solutions. This is discussed in greater detail
in Parts II.A.2 and II.D.2, which explore how procedural variations and the
resulting nonrandom distribution of cases have made it difficult to ascertain
the effectiveness of reforms (e.g., AIA), changes in the law (e.g., the Supreme
Court’s patentable subject matter case law), and experiments (e.g., the Patent
Pilot Program).

103. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent Rules, supra note 18, at § 4.
104. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., In re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In reviewing
a district court’s ruling on a motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a), we apply the law of the regional
circuit . . . .”); Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The
denial of a motion to amend a pleading under Rule 15(a) is a procedural matter governed by the law
of the regional circuit.”).
107. See La Belle, Local Rules, supra note 18, at 96–97.
108. See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 250‒70 (explaining how the Eastern District of
Texas’s procedural rules and case management practices attract patentees).
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Given the problems arising from procedural variance, those wary of
setting up a specialized patent trial court might wonder if a less “drastic”
alternative would suffice: conducting patent litigation in the district courts
with a uniform set of procedural rules specifically for patent cases. Notably,
Megan La Belle has argued for the adoption of a “Federal Rules of Patent
Procedure” that is a patent litigation version of the FRCP. 109 Drawing on the
procedure for rulemaking in bankruptcy cases,110 La Belle proposes that
Congress should provide the Supreme Court with rulemaking authority over
patent cases to create the “Federal Rules of Patent Procedure.”111 These rules
would be drafted through a process similar to that of the FRCP, whereby a
“Patent Rules Advisory Committee” would draft the rules with public input,
which would then be transmitted to the Supreme Court for approval, followed
by congressional review.112
A significant limitation of adopting specialized patent procedural rules
for use in the district courts is that, once adopted, it may be difficult to update
those rules as circumstances change. This is because the procedural rules
governing district court litigation may need to be amended through the
cumbersome Federal Rules revision process, which can take several years.113
An even more cumbersome option would be the statutory route: If, like the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),114 the specialized rules
for patent cases were instead specified by statute, then any amendment would
require an act of Congress, which tends to be rare and sporadic on patent
issues because of industry stalemates.115 The ease with which a set of
procedural rules can be amended is important because it will facilitate

109. Id. at 68.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases
under title 11 [bankruptcy].”).
111. La Belle, Local Rules, supra note 18, at 120.
112. Id. at 120–23.
113. Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-andpublic (last visited June 19, 2021) (“The rulemaking process is time consuming and involves a
minimum of seven stages of formal comment and review. From beginning to end, it usually takes
two to three years for a suggestion to be enacted as a rule.”).
114. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA provisions include heightened pleading
requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) to (2), and a stay of “all discovery and other
proceedings . . . during the pendency of any motion to dismiss.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
115. See Timothy B. Lee, How Democrats and Trial Lawyers Killed Patent Reform, VOX (May
23, 2014, 1:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2014/5/23/5742620/patent-reform-is-dead-hereswho-killed-it (last visited June 19, 2021) (“For years, the patent reform debate has been a stalemate
between pro-reform technology companies and pharmaceutical companies that favored the status
quo.”).
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iteration. As mentioned previously, iteration is important because it is
difficult to craft a rule that will work correctly the first time. This is because,
as the experience with the Section 299 joinder rule illustrates, the ways to
circumvent a new rule may not be apparent until it is tested in litigation. 116
Accordingly, we need a way to easily update the rules in an iterative fashion.
A specialized patent trial court that is empowered to promulgate its own rules
of practice is one configuration where this may be possible.
In addition, a single trial court makes it easier to coordinate among
judges to ensure that a common set of rules is consistently applied. For this
reason, even if a “Federal Rules of Patent Procedure” were created for the
district courts, coordination problems among the hundreds of judges in
ninety-four districts may undermine its consistent application, thereby
providing limited protection against forum shopping, which can be a
diagnostic confounder. By way of example, the PSLRA was enacted in the
context of securities litigation for reasons that are similar to the perennial
calls for patent reform: to combat abusive litigation and nuisance suits.117 But
the inconsistent application of the PSLRA among the district courts likely
undermined its effectiveness.118 According to Sean Griffith, “[c]onsistent
application of the PSLRA . . . requires judicial coordination which has so far
been lacking among federal district courts,”119 in that the “judges have been
unable (or unwilling) to coalesce around a single interpretation of the
PSLRA.”120 To emphasize the importance of coordination, Griffith notes that
the Delaware Chancery Court has managed to solve the problem of mergerrelated nuisance litigation by issuing an influential decision,121 unlike the
federal courts where it continues “largely unabated.”122 Specifically, Griffith
credits the fact that “in Delaware[,] a single court, the Court of Chancery,
hears all corporate law cases,”123 which facilitates coordination amongst its
judges: “[B]ecause the members of the Court of Chancery hear so many
related cases and regularly meet to discuss them, it is relatively easy for the
court to design a coherent and consistent approach to recurring issues.”124 By

116. See supra text accompanying notes 97‒105.
117. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
118. See Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits: Evidence from Frequent Filer
Shareholder Plaintiffs 4, 19 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 502, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470330.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Griffith credits In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016) for this
result. Id. at 5, 23.
122. Id. at 23.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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contrast, the federal judiciary, with over 600 judges, is largely
uncoordinated.125
The lack of coordination among a group judges who apply the same set
of rules may not always reflect a difference of opinion or a lack of
communication. In some cases, it may be driven by forum selling. A prime
example of this is the forum selling that occurs in the bankruptcy courts,
which operate under a common set of specialized procedural rules: the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Lynn LoPucki has chronicled this
phenomenon,126 in which some bankruptcy courts engage in behavior that
resembles the practices of the plaintiff-friendly Eastern District of Texas in
patent cases,127 whereby those courts, in order to attract more cases, adopt
case management practices that tend to favor the party that selects the
venue.128 While having a uniform set of rules is a critical ingredient for
mitigating diagnostic confounders, it is insufficient by itself when there are
multiple venues, as discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.2.
2. Venue
An oft-cited justification in the literature for a specialized patent trial
court is the elimination of forum (or judge) shopping in the district courts.129
However, there is an additional benefit of concentrating patent cases in a
single court: the elimination of venue as a confounder in diagnosing problems
in patent litigation and assessing whether a reform is working as intended. If
there are multiple venues when a change in the law occurs, new case filings
may shift to those venues where the judges’ manner of interpretation or
application of the new law will have a greater or lesser impact, depending on
the objectives of the litigants. Having multiple district courts available for
patent cases creates a “shifting sands” environment that can make it difficult
to ascertain why some change in the law failed to have its intended impact:
Was the change in the law ineffective because it was defective to begin with?
Or, was it ineffective because it was somehow being circumvented or
sidestepped through forum shopping? Or something else?
As chronicled by Brian Love and James Yoon with statistics comparing
rulings among popular patent venues, there have been several major reforms

125. Id.
126. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
127. See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 245 (noting “the Eastern District of Texas’s propatentee bias and particular attractiveness to patent assertion entities”).
128. See id. at 292‒94 (comparing forum selling in patent cases with LoPucki’s observations in
bankruptcy cases).
129. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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within the past decade whose effects might have been blunted as a result of
forum shopping.130 For example, the AIA established three new proceedings
that allowed the public to challenge the validity of issued patents at the PTO’s
internal tribunal, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”): Inter Partes
Review,131 Post-Grant Review,132 and Covered Business Method Review.133
These post-issuance proceedings are intended to serve as faster, lower-cost
alternatives to district court litigation. 134 However, patentees who file suit in
districts that have low rates of granting stays during the pendency of a PTAB
post-issuance proceeding135 could still force accused infringers to incur the
high cost of district court litigation throughout the case.136 The refusal to
grant a stay has become even more advantageous for patentees in light of
recent changes to PTAB practice: the PTAB now takes into account whether
any related district court case is stayed in deciding whether to discretionarily
dismiss a petition for a post-issuance challenge.137 Another AIA reform that
has been prone to circumvention is the Section 299 joinder restriction.138 As
discussed in Part II.A.1, patentees have circumvented the spirit of this law by
filing multiple single-defendant suits in districts where judges are inclined to
grant pretrial consolidation of cases involving the same patent, so as to
effectively recreate the single-suit, multi-defendant dynamic that existed
before the enactment of Section 299.139
130. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation
in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2017) [hereinafter Love & Yoon,
Predictably Expensive].
131. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319.
132. Id. §§ 321–329.
133. Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300–.304
(2020).
134. In 2017, the median cost of a patent infringement suit in federal court (inclusive of pre- and
post-trial and appeal) ranged between $500,000 to $3 million, depending on the amount at risk. AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2017). For a PTAB postgrant proceeding, the median cost though appeal was $350,000. Id. at 43.
135. See Love & Yoon, Predictably Expensive, supra note 130, at 26–27 (“Judges in the District
of Delaware and Northern District of California grant motions to stay, at least in part, over 70% of
the time. By contrast, the grant rate in the Eastern District of Texas is less than 58%.”).
136. Id.
137. See infra notes 271–277 and accompanying text.
138. 35 U.S.C. § 299.
139. See Love & Yoon, Predictably Expensive, supra note 130, at 27–29; see also Charles R.
Macedo, Michael J. Kasdan & David A. Boag, AIA’s Impact On Multidefendant Patent Litigation:
Part 2, LAW360, (Oct. 26, 2012, 12:34 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/387458/aia-simpact-on-multidefendant-patent-litigation-part-2 (“Immediately after the AIA was enacted, many
NPEs began to conform their practices: Instead of instituting one massive multidefendant
infringement action, they would institute a multitude of separate but nearly identical patent
infringement complaints against unrelated entities in the same court.”). This tactic can be seen in
the dramatic difference in the average number of patent cases filed in U.S. district courts before
(under 3,000) and after (over 5,000) the AIA was enacted in 2011. See Dennis Crouch, US Patent
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Changes introduced through case law have also been the subject of
circumvention attempts through forum shopping. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l,140 the Supreme Court effectively excluded from the scope of patentable
subject matter large swaths of computerized business method patents, which
are often favored by PAEs.141 Accused infringers have since used Alice to
obtain early dismissals of nuisance cases through motions to dismiss and
summary judgment.142 However, in some districts that are popular with
patentees, such as the Eastern District of Texas, early dismissals are rarely
granted on patentable subject matter grounds.143 Similarly, after the Supreme
Court, in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,144 made it
easier to award attorney fees, substantial disparities emerged among the
districts in the grant rate for fee motions and the amounts awarded.145
Such variation among the districts (and also among individual judges)
in applying the reforms can make it difficult to ascertain whether (and what
kind of) additional reforms might be necessary. Much like the problems with
the PSLRA discussed earlier in Part II.A.1, coordination problems among
district judges can undermine the effectiveness of a reform or a change in the
law.146
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft
Foods Group Brands LLC147 narrowed the universe of patent case venues, it
is unlikely that it has improved the situation enough to obviate the need to
further restrict forum choice. TC Heartland held that the patent venue statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), limits venue to either the defendant’s state of
incorporation or where it has committed infringement and has “a regular and
established place of business.”148 In the aftermath of TC Heartland, the most
salient changes occurred in the District of Delaware (72% increase in filings
after one year) and the Eastern District of Texas (68% decrease in filings after
one year).149 Although the Eastern District of Texas has seen a drop in new
Litigation
New
Filings
By
Year,
PATENTLY-O
(Dec.
19,
2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/patent-litigation-filings.html.
140. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
141. See Ryan Davis, High Court’s Alice Ruling Brings Software Patent Clarity, LAW360 (June
19, 2014, 8:43 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/549793/high-court-s-alice-rulingbrings-software-patent-clarity.
142. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
143. See Love & Yoon, Predictably Expensive, supra note 130, at 30–32.
144. 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
145. See Love & Yoon, Predictably Expensive, supra note 130, at 32–33.
146. See supra notes 117‒125 and accompanying text.
147. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1516–17.
149. Shawn P. Miller, Venue One Year After TC Heartland: An Early Empirical Assessment of
the Major Changes in Patent Filing, 52 AKRON L. REV. 763, 781 (2018).
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cases after TC Heartland, the phrase “regular and established place of
business” in the patent venue statute is a flexible, highly fact-dependent
inquiry that still keeps many venue options open for plaintiffs because “the
‘place’ need not be a ‘fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office
or store’ . . . .”150 Notably, even after TC Heartland, a recently appointed
district judge, Alan Albright, managed to attract, through forum selling, a
high volume of patent cases in the Western District of Texas, much like the
Eastern District of Texas.151 In 2018, Judge Albright had just twenty-eight
new patent cases; in 2020, he had 793 new filings.152
To eliminate forum shopping/selling, the most direct solution, as
recognized in the literature,153 would be to have a single, specialized patent
trial court, which is the option proposed in this Article. Some commentators,
however, have proposed limiting venue to the defendant’s principal place of
business154 or the largest market for the accused product.155 With respect to
relying on the principal place of business, companies can still manipulate
venue by moving their headquarters, which, according to Lynn LoPucki, has
occurred in bankruptcy cases.156 More generally, companies move their
operations across state lines for a variety of reasons, such as to avoid
unfavorable laws157 and to take advantage of economic incentives (e.g., lower
taxes) offered by other states.158 In addition, a court that is engaged in forum
150. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Cordis Corp., 796 F.2d
733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
151. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & J. Jonas Anderson, Guest Post: How the West Became the East:
The Patent Litigation Explosion in the Western District of Texas, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosion-district.html.
152. Dani Kass, Judge Albright Now Oversees 20% of New US Patent Cases, LAW360 (Mar. 10,
2021, 11:05 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/1361071/judge-albright-now-oversees20-of-new-us-patent-cases [hereinafter Kass, Albright].
153. See Moore, supra note 53, at 932 (noting that a specialized trial court “would eliminate
forum shopping entirely, as there would be no possible alternative forum”).
154. Fromer, Patentography, supra note 66, at 1447.
155. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 304.
156. See LOPUCKI, supra note 126, at 32 (“Some of the firms we studied did move their
headquarters to manipulate venue.”).
157. For example, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla Motors, threatened to move Tesla out of California
in response to the pandemic-related reopening policies of Alameda County, California, that affected
his manufacturing plant. See Tim Mullaney, Elon Musk’s Threat to Leave California Could Cost
Tesla $1 billion—and Be Worth It, CNBC (May 20, 2020, 3:30 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/20/elon-musks-threat-to-leave-california-could-cost-tesla-1billion.html.
158. See, e.g., Shayndi Rice, Tired of Fighting for Business, Missouri and Kansas Near CeaseFire Over Incentives,
WALL ST. J.
(June 25, 2019, 8:34 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tired-of-fighting-for-business-missouri-and-kansas-near-cease-firedeal-over-incentives-11561455003 (“According to the Hall Family Foundation, 116 companies
moved their operations across Kansas City into the neighboring state between 2011 and 2019. The
states paid $335 million in economic incentives due to the moves.”).
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selling might endeavor to determine the defendant’s “principal place of
business” in a manner that supports the plaintiff’s forum choice.159 As for
tying venue to the largest market for the accused product, this, too, might be
susceptible to manipulation, depending on how the “largest market” is
defined and how sales are geographically allocated. Such manipulations are
within the realm of possibility, especially for sophisticated companies like
Apple Inc., which has moved retail locations to avoid being haled into the
Eastern District of Texas,160 and has managed to keep its profits offshore to
avoid paying U.S. taxes.161
Another issue with venue proposals that do not require a single,
exclusive venue is that patent cases may become clustered or concentrated in
certain districts. As mentioned throughout this Part, the nonrandom
distribution of patent cases among the districts can be difficult to control for
in empirical studies of patent litigation and could lead to inconclusive
results.162 And, depending on how a particular district assigns cases, a single
judge may preside over a disproportionate number of patent cases, further
distorting the results. For example, the case allocation policies for the
Eastern and Western Districts of Texas give plaintiffs a high probability of
being assigned to their preferred judge upon filing in a particular division
within the district, especially if that division has only a single district judge.163
This has allowed Judge Alan Albright of the Western District of Texas and
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas to rank first and
second, respectively, among district judges in the number of new patent cases
added to their dockets in 2020, with Judge Albright presiding over almost a

159. Cf. LOPUCKI, supra note 126, at 31‒33.
160. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Apple confirms its plans to close retail stores in the patent trollfavored Eastern District of Texas, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2019, 2:47 PM CST),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/22/apple-confirms-its-plans-to-close-retail-stores-in-the-patenttroll-favored-eastern-district-of-texas/ (“Apple has confirmed its plans to close retail stores in the
Eastern District of Texas—a move that will allow the company to better protect itself from patent
infringement lawsuits . . . .”).
161. How Apple Managed to Pay Almost No Tax on Billions in Profits, CBC RADIO (Nov. 10,
2017 5:58 PM ET), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/how-apple-managed-to-pay-almost-no-tax-onbillions-in-profits-1.4391505.
162. An illustrative case is the Patent Pilot Program discussed in Part II.D.2, infra.
163. See General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions, General Order No. 21-08, at 1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/goFiles/GO%202108%20Assigning%20Civil%20and%20Criminal%20Actions.pdf (indicating that Chief Judge
Rodney Gilstrap is assigned 100% of the patent cases filed in the Marshall division); Amended
Order Assigning the Business of the Court (W.D. Tex. May 10, 2021),
https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/wpcontent/uploads/Standing%20Orders/District/Amended%20Order%20Assigning%20Business%20
of%20the%20Court%20051021.pdf (indicating that Judge Alan Albright is assigned “[a]ll cases
and proceedings in the Waco Division.”).
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fifth of all new patent cases filed that year.164 Allowing patent cases to cluster
in nonrandom ways can amplify the idiosyncrasies of certain districts or
individual judges in patent case adjudication data, which can make it difficult
to accurately discern the nature of a problem or to reliably evaluate the impact
of a change in the law. By contrast, a single patent trial court where all the
cases are assigned randomly to the judges, such that all judges will preside
over a mix of patent case types, may yield results that are more meaningful.
To be clear, having a single patent trial court will not eliminate all
potential confounders. Rather, the single venue would eliminate some
sources of variance (e.g., multiple venues, different procedural rules), while
dampening other types of variance (e.g., the trial judges’ patent case
experience, the mix of cases each judge handles). Although this arrangement
would not eliminate judge-to-judge variance in matters that involve the
exercise of discretion, such as case management, it would substantially
mitigate such variance by removing the need for forum selling.
3. Trial Judge Experience
Because the proposed specialized patent trial court would hear only
patent cases, all of its trial judges would eventually become patent litigation
specialists, even if they were generalists with no patent experience prior to
their appointment.165 The use of specialist trial judges may contribute to
diagnostic efficiency by mitigating possible confounders related to
adjudicator experience. Currently, it can be difficult to figure out whether a
problematic litigation outcome in a patent case is attributable to the
adjudicator’s lack of fluency in patent law, suboptimalities in substantive
patent doctrine, locality-based differences in procedure and case
management practices, some other reason, or some combination of the
foregoing.
An illustration of how differences in adjudicator experience could have
a material impact on case outcomes is provided by a study conducted by Mark
Lemley, Su Li, and Jennifer Urban.166 Their data suggest that district judges
with considerable patent case experience tend to rule against the patentee on
infringement issues by a statistically significant margin when compared to
judges who are inexperienced with patent cases.167 In calling for additional

164. Kass, Albright, supra note 152.
165. See Judge James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial
Bench, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 429 (2002) (“Typically, U.S. District Judges have little or
no background experience in patent litigation . . . .”).
166. Mark A. Lemley, Su Li & Jennifer Urban, Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges
Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121 (2014).
167. Id. at 1121, 1140–44.
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empirical research that “could indicate further paths for reform,”168 Lemley,
Li, and Urban acknowledge that “isolating the effects of specialist experience
or expertise is an exceedingly complex task.”169 They note that their “results
are necessarily limited in that they do not take into account differences in
local rules and other specifics local to trial courts,”170 which are potential
diagnostic confounders, as discussed earlier.
Indeed, gauging the effects of adjudicator experience has been
particularly difficult for what is perhaps the most important issue in a patent
case: claim construction.171 Claim construction is the process of construing
the language of a patent claim to ascertain “the scope of the patentee’s rights
under the patent.”172 The difficulty of construing claims “correctly”
(however defined) is illustrated by the frequent reversals of district court
judgments based on claim construction errors, which have yielded a
substantial body of literature on the unpredictability of claim construction.173
Part of the uncertainty may be attributable to the de novo standard of
review174 and the phenomenon of panel dependence at the Federal Circuit.175
Another contributor to the uncertainty may lie with the trial judge’s
characteristics: there may be instances when a district judge applied the law
incorrectly because of their lack of familiarity with patent law. In other
instances, however, the applicable claim construction canon might have been
difficult to apply consistently, even by patent-savvy trial judges. As a result,
it may not always be clear whether a claim construction ruling was “wrong”
because of a trial judge’s lack of patent law experience or a flaw in the
Federal Circuit’s precedents and practices, or a combination.
Isolating the effect of experience can be challenging in light of the
variations in local procedures and the nonrandom distribution of patent cases
among the district courts—and studies have yielded mixed results. For
168. Id. at 1154.
169. Id. at 1155.
170. Id.
171. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“Claim construction is the single most important event in the course of a
patent litigation. It defines the scope of the property right being enforced, and is often the difference
between infringement and non-infringement, or validity and invalidity.”); see also Arti K. Rai,
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1035, 1059 (2003) [hereinafter Rai, Engaging Facts] (“Claim construction is often
determinative of all other questions in the case . . . .”).
172. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
173. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 72, at 4–5 nn.6–11 (collecting sources).
174. Claim construction, as a question of law, is reviewed de novo, while any subsidiary
factfinding by the trial court is reviewed for clear error. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
574 U.S. 318, 324–29 (2015).
175. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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example, a study by David Schwartz suggests that reversal rates on claim
construction issues may not necessarily improve with a trial judge’s level of
patent law experience.176 However, Schwartz noted several limitations of his
study, which include: a nonrandom distribution of cases among the districts,
which “may be particularly profound if the types of parties to the lawsuits
have some relationship to the difficulty or closeness of the claim construction
issues”;177 the possibility that a “higher appeal rate of certain types of parties
would magnify the effect of any selection bias”;178 and variations in
settlement practices among judges.179 In a further attempt to isolate the effect
of expertise, Schwartz looked at the claim construction reversal rate of the
administrative law judges (“ALJs”) of the United States International Trade
Commission (“ITC”),180 an agency tribunal that investigates the importation
of products that allegedly infringe U.S. patents.181 The ALJs are considered
highly experienced in patent law adjudication,182 but Schwartz did not find
that the ALJs fared better on appeal than the district judges.183 Schwartz
acknowledges that these results, while informative, should be viewed with
caution, given the small population of ITC cases, procedural differences
between the ITC and the district courts, and any “case-selection effects [that]
may differ for the two fora.”184 By contrast, Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball
found that “the accuracy of claim construction rulings increases with the
amount of experience [district] judges have in issuing such rulings,” 185 with
the caveat that the underreporting of claim construction rulings, which varied
by district, could have influenced the results.186
A further complicating factor when assessing the impact of patent law
experience may be the Federal Circuit judges’ degree of rapport with the trial
judge whose claim construction rulings are under review. Specifically, a

176. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258–59 (2008) (reporting results
suggesting that “[t]here is no compelling evidence that trial court judges are improving with
experience on claim construction”).
177. Id. at 242.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1699 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Courting
Specialization].
181. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B).
182. See Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 180, at 1702.
183. Id. at 1704.
184. Id. at 1720.
185. Kesan & Ball, supra note 71, at 442.
186. Id. at 442‒43.
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study by Mark Lemley and Shawn Miller reveals that the improvement in
claim construction reversal rates among some trial judges might be
attributable to their rapport with the appellate judges that developed while
sitting by designation at the Federal Circuit, rather than any learning effects
from their visit to the appellate court.187
The claim construction studies demonstrate the methodological
difficulty in controlling for the differences in procedures and, in some cases,
the availability of data, among ninety-four district courts in order to isolate
the effect of experience. If experience cannot easily be isolated as a factor,
it may be worthwhile to mitigate its potential impact as a diagnostic
confounder by reducing the experience differentials among the trial judges.
By setting up a single, dedicated patent trial court with judges who only hear
patent cases, the variance in trial judge experience would decrease because
all the judges on the specialized trial court would become highly experienced.
Also, it may be easier to maintain and establish rapport between the Federal
Circuit judges and all of the specialized trial judges: The latter would be a
discrete group, whose ability to regularly sit by designation at the Federal
Circuit can be more easily scheduled and coordinated than the district judges,
such that all of the specialized judges would readily acquire the experience
of sitting by designation and the unofficial deference that it brings.
More generally, reducing the variance in patent case adjudication
experience at all levels—not just among the trial judges but also between the
trial and appellate levels—would be especially beneficial in diagnosing
problematic precedents, as it may reveal more clearly the contexts and
circumstances under which some substantive patent doctrine is unworkable.
A precedent can be more clearly shown to be suboptimal if it yields
unpredictable or problematic results when applied by judges with similar
levels of expertise at different levels of the judicial hierarchy. That is, the
strength of the error signal (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio) will increase with
fewer confounding variables or where those variables have been mitigated.
Greater clarity in how the doctrines are being (mis)applied may, in turn,
suggest better fixes, especially if a pattern can be discerned about the errors
(e.g., if certain errors repeat under certain circumstances).

187. Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em? How Sitting by
Designation Affects Judicial Behavior, 94 TEX. L. REV. 451, 473 (2016) (“Both judges who heard
claim construction cases on appeal and those who didn’t benefitted from the after-designation effect
in their subsequent claim construction appeals. . . . This suggests that neither substantive learning
about claim construction nor even learning what Federal Circuit judges like to read in a claim
construction opinion are at work . . . .”).
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B. Facilitating Treatment within a Sandbox
As discussed in the previous Section, a specialized patent trial court that
provides a controlled environment for patent litigation can enhance diagnosis
by removing confounders, thereby making it more likely that a proposed
reform or change in the law can be appropriately tailored to have the intended
salutary effect. Often, however, the problem is sufficiently complex such
that the initial solution may fall short of expectations. When this happens,
there may need to be further tweaking of the solution based on an updated
understanding of the problem. That is, when an initial impression of the
problem yields a suboptimal remedy, iteration may be required. Like the
physician who tells a patient to try a remedy and call if the condition does not
improve, sometimes the underlying condition may not be apparent until we
find out which remedy does not work. Accordingly, in order to find a
solution that is ultimately effective, having the ability to try out different
solutions in an iterative manner is important.
As it happens, the controlled environment created by a specialized
patent trial court that can promulgate its own rules provides an additional,
complementary benefit beyond diagnosis—namely, the “sandboxing”188 of
patent litigation, which could make it easier to introduce changes to the law,
iteratively fine-tune such changes, and facilitate experimentation because
their impact would be largely localized to patent litigation, and thus unlikely
to affect civil litigation in general. An accurate diagnosis, while necessary,
is often insufficient by itself for surmounting the barriers to the adoption of
a particular reform or change in the law. So long as patent litigation is
conducted in federal district court and is governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and other procedural rules of general applicability,
objections raised by an expanded universe of stakeholders outside the patent
system, as well as concerns about trans-substantivity in the federal rules
governing procedure, may limit the options for reforming patent litigation by
Congress and the courts. However, such barriers to change could be lowered
through the sandboxing effect of a specialized trial court.
By way of illustration, multiple patent reform bills have included a
provision to make fee-shifting easier in order to address the problem of
abusive patent litigation.189 However, this provision has been successfully
opposed by the trial lawyer lobby and others who are wary of setting a
precedent that might be used to depart from the “American rule” (in which

188. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
189. See PATENT PROGRESS, supra note 4.
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each party pays its own legal fees)190 in other types of litigation,191 given that
patent cases are heard in the same federal district courts alongside other cases
before the same judges.192 If Congress’s ability to reform patent litigation is
being hampered by intermeddling or opposition from interest groups outside
the patent system, then isolating patent cases in a procedural sandbox and
removing them from the district courts could help alleviate their concerns.
As for the interest groups within the patent system (e.g., high-tech, big
pharma), the isolation of patent cases, by itself, may have very little impact
on their lobbying activities in Congress.193 For these interest groups, another
feature of the proposed court would help mitigate the effects of their
lobbying: the ability to promulgate its own rules of practice. A meaningful
procedural change may have a better chance of coming to fruition if it were
promulgated as a rule by the proposed specialized trial court, rather than
through an act of Congress, as the latter may be more strongly influenced by
stakeholder lobbying than the former.194
In addition, concerns about trans-substantivity in the federal procedural
rules may also limit possibilities for reforming patent litigation. For example,
the Federal Circuit may not be able to impose or experiment with a rule of
procedure for patent litigation that is tailored to the idiosyncrasies of patent
law without exposing itself to the risk of override by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has generally viewed patent law exceptionalism with
skepticism, and has struck down several Federal Circuit precedents that have
put too much of a patent law-related gloss on general legal principles, such
as those relating to injunctions195 and declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 196
More recently, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s longstanding practice of reviewing district court claim construction rulings
190. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“Our basic
point of reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as
the ‘American Rule’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or
contract provides otherwise.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
191. See Timothy B. Lee, 2015 Could Be The Year Congress Takes Action on Patent Trolls,
VOX (Apr. 27, 2015, 9:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/4/27/8501489/patent-reform-2015
(“Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), an ally of trial lawyers who opposed the [patent
reform] legislation, blocked it. . . . Trial lawyers are concerned that including . . . language [about
fee-shifting] in a patent reform bill could set a precedent for applying similar rules to other types of
litigation.”).
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
193. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
194. According to one estimate, “hundreds of millions of dollars [were] spent . . . to influence
Congress on patent reform in 2013 and 2014.” Tom Risen, How the Tech Lobby Got Beat, U.S.
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/16/how-thetech-lobby-got-beat.
195. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
196. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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wholly de novo, holding that this practice contravenes FRCP 52(a), which
requires appellate courts to review subsidiary factual issues for clear error.197
The need for a patent litigation sandbox where the procedural rules can
be iteratively tailored to accommodate the idiosyncratic nature of patent law
is illustrated by the problem of filtering weak cases. An example that
illustrates the strained interactions between the current general procedural
rules and substantive patent law is the phenomenon in recent years where, in
the wake of Alice,198 increasing numbers of accused infringers have moved
for dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on the ground
that the asserted claims are directed to subject matter ineligible for patenting
(e.g., laws of nature, natural products/phenomena, abstract ideas).199 These
motions have been popular with defendants as a way to obtain early
dismissals of weak cases with overly broad patents. The problem is that the
development of patentable subject matter doctrine may be affected by its use
in Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, and vice versa.200
The difficulty of culling questionable patent assertions under the current
procedural rules has created a situation where patentable subject matter
challenges are being awkwardly repurposed as a tool for 12(b)(6) dismissals,
which is further complicated by the extent to which such challenges raise
questions of fact201 or claim construction issues.202 This may be an indication
that the current pleading framework under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly203
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal204 does not appear to provide much of a barrier to
questionable patent assertions. While there is a need for an efficient
197. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 326 (2015) (“[W]hen we held in
Markman that the ultimate question of claim construction is for the judge and not the jury, we did
not create an exception from the ordinary rule governing appellate review of factual
matters. . . . [T]hat an issue is for the judge does not indicate that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable.”).
198. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
199. See Ana Friedman, Section 101 Motions to Dismiss Still Alive in District Courts,
IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/14/section-101-motionsdismiss/id=104136/.
200. For a detailed discussion on the intersection between eligibility issues and procedure, see
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2019).
201. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 911
(2020) (“While patent eligibility is ultimately a question of law, the district court erred in concluding
there are no underlying factual questions to the § 101 inquiry. Whether something is wellunderstood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination.” (internal citation omitted)).
202. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“If there are claim construction disputes at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we have held that either
the court must proceed by adopting the non-moving party’s constructions, or the court must resolve
the disputes to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
203. 550 U.S. 544, 555‒56 (2007).
204. 556 U.S. 662, 677‒80 (2009).
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mechanism for filtering non-meritorious pleadings, the ability of the district
courts and the Federal Circuit to introduce changes to the pleading standards
for patent cases under FRCP 8(a), or the manner of evaluating motions under
FRCP 12(b)(6), is limited in light of trans-substantivity considerations. That
is, the Federal Circuit must avoid creating idiosyncratic, patent law versions
of FRCP 12(b)(6) and FRCP 8(a), and, at the same time, avoid distorting
patentable subject matter doctrine when reviewing dismissals on appeal.
If, however, there were a specialized patent trial court empowered to
promulgate its own procedural rules, it can adopt versions of FRCP 12(b)(6),
FRCP 8(a), or other pleading rules that are tailored to the idiosyncrasies of
patent law. Because patent litigation would occur in a sandbox under this
proposal, the patent trial court’s procedural rules can be iteratively tweaked
as necessary to tackle abusive patent assertions205 without affecting the rules
for general litigation.
One might ask, however, why patent litigation warrants a sandbox in the
form of a specialized trial court when it already has a variety of specialized
procedural rules for use in the district courts, such as: the patent local rules
adopted in several dozen district courts206 to facilitate case management;207
the Hatch-Waxman litigation regime for patent suits filed in connection with
the Food and Drug Administration’s approval process for generic drugs; 208
the patent-specific venue rule;209 and the AIA joinder rule.210 However, the
primary rules that currently serve a gatekeeping function in patent litigation
and affect the bulk of litigation activity—such as pleading and discovery—
are procedural rules of general applicability found in the FRCP. 211 For this
reason, multiple patent reform bills over the years have proposed changes to
the Patent Act that would provide, by statute, special rules to tighten pleading
standards212 and impose limits on discovery213 in patent cases.
205. The abusive assertions relate to the activities of entities variously called “patent trolls,”
patent assertion entities (“PAEs”), or non-practicing entities (“NPEs”). A search on Westlaw on
February 15, 2020 reveals that within the past fifteen years, over 100 law journal articles have been
written that contain the terms “patent troll” or PAE or NPE in the title.
206. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
207. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (observing that “the [patent local] rules are essentially a series of case management orders”).
208. See 21 U.S.C. § 355; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 299.
211. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 26‒37.
212. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309,
113th Cong. § 3(a) (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2(a); Patent
Litigation and Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013).
213. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(d) (2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309,
113th Cong. § 3(d) (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 4; Patent
Litigation and Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. § 5 (2013).
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In addition, there are several idiosyncratic aspects of patent law that
make it desirable to have a sandbox to iteratively develop and fine-tune
patent-specific procedural rules.
As mentioned previously, claim
construction is a gating item that permeates nearly all aspects of a patent
case.214 As such, it can profoundly affect case management issues, including
scheduling,215 dispositive motions,216 and motions to dismiss under FRCP
12(b)(6).217 Moreover, patent infringement is a strict liability cause of
action;218 the fact that knowledge or intent does not matter opens up,
considerably, the universe of possible defendants—the vast majority of
whom are not alleged to have copied the plaintiff’s invention.219 Further
exacerbating the potential for suit is that patent law provides a “negative
right”—the right to exclude—which, when combined with the voluminous
patent grants by the PTO,220 gives rise to thickets of overlapping rights: A
single product may be covered by—and hence subject to suit for infringement
of—an untold number of patents.221 (For example, according to one estimate,
a smartphone may be covered by 250,000 patents.222) Finally, patent
litigation is currently conducted in generalist trial courts that are reviewed by
a specialist appeals court—an idiosyncratic trial-appellate configuration that
leads to a high reversal rate because the expert appellate judges have a
tendency to second-guess the generalist trial judges, even on issues that are
arguably factual.223 Related to this last point is that, unlike other areas of the
law, patent litigation is subject to an express mandate for uniformity,
predictability, and the elimination of forum shopping, which led to the
creation of the Federal Circuit.224 These characteristics, in the aggregate,

214. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent Rules, supra note 18, at § 4.
216. See, e.g., id. at § 4-1(b) (requiring parties to identify “those terms for which construction
may be case or claim dispositive”).
217. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
218. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
219. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421,
1424 (2009) (“[A] surprisingly small percentage of patent cases involve even allegations of copying,
much less proof of copying. Only 10.9% of the complaints studied—21 of 193 complaints—
contained even an allegation that the defendant copied the invention, either from the patent or from
the plaintiff’s commercial product.”).
220. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
221. Cf. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 76, at 1614.
222. Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
25,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-showssmartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html (“By one estimate, as many as 250,000 patents can be used to
claim ownership of some technical or design element in a smartphone. Each patent is potentially a
license to sue.”).
223. See infra notes 256–258 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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make patent cases difficult to manage using generally applicable procedural
rules in the district courts.
C. Implementing a Specialized Patent Trial Court
As proposed in this Article, a controlled environment for patent
litigation that reduces diagnostic confounders, and also provides a sandbox
that facilitates the introduction and iteration of procedural reforms, could be
achieved by setting up a specialized Article III patent trial court that is
empowered to promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure. This
proposed court will serve as the exclusive trial-level venue for patent cases
in the United States, where a single set of procedural rules will be applied by
its judges, all of whom will have (or will acquire) substantial experience in
patent case adjudication. As explained in Part II.A, this will help eliminate
or reduce the magnitude of potential diagnostic confounders along at least
three dimensions: procedural rules, venue, and trial judge experience.
Another key feature is that the patent trial court would be empowered to adopt
and modify its rules of practice without going through the cumbersome
Federal Rules amendment process or requiring an act of Congress. As
explained in greater detail in this Section, this arrangement creates a
procedural sandbox that would allow the rules to be iteratively tweaked as
necessary to facilitate diagnosis of problems in patent litigation and make it
easier to craft potential solutions.
Although the proposal requires a single court, the judges of the
specialized trial court need not all be located in a single physical building;
the judges can maintain their chambers anywhere in the United States.225
This would expand the pool for recruiting judges to serve on the court.
Because cases would be assigned randomly to the judges to prevent forum
shopping and selling, all pretrial activities would occur “on the papers” or
through videoconferencing to obviate the need for the parties to appear in
person. The feasibility of holding hearings without requiring in-person
attendance has been established in recent years. For example, the PTAB’s
teleworking administrative patent judges (“APJs”) have long participated in
hearings through videoconferencing.226 More recently, federal courts have

225. This is unlike the Federal Circuit, whose active judges are required to reside within fifty
miles of the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. § 44(c).
226. See Wayne Stoner & Peter Dichiara, A Practical Guide to Inter Partes Review 21,
WILMERHALE
(Sept.
14,
2014),
http://www.wilmerhale.com//media/files/Shared_Content/Events/Documents/WilmerHale-webinar-IPR-Post-Merits-BriefingConsiderations-17Sep14.pdf (“Remote APJs ‘attend’ via videoconference on a TV positioned next
to the bench.”).
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been holding motion hearings227 and even jury trials228 through
videoconferencing due to the COVID-19 pandemic. If an in-person jury trial
is necessary, it can be held in any federal courthouse in the United States
based on an analysis of the relevant justice (i.e., public interest) and
convenience factors for evaluating venue options.229 To ensure that the trial
judge does not favor their own location for trial, the selection of the trial
location would be made by a “venue panel” composed of three trial judges
selected at random who would decide the trial location based on briefing by
the parties. Once a location is selected, the trial judge and the parties would
travel there to conduct the trial.
Key aspects of the proposed specialized patent trial court could be
modeled after certain features of the United States Court of International
Trade (“USCIT”), an Article III specialized trial court whose judgments are
appealed to the Federal Circuit.230 The proposal in this Article should not be
confused with a proposal by John Pegram to grant the USCIT concurrent
patent case jurisdiction with the district courts.231 Unlike Pegram’s plan, this
Article does not propose changing the scope of the USCIT’s original
jurisdiction. Rather, the proposed specialized patent trial court will be a
separate, standalone court that will be the exclusive trial-level venue for
patent cases in the United States; the district courts will not hear patent cases
under the proposal in this Article.
There are several features of the USCIT that may be instructive in the
design and operation of the proposed specialized patent trial court. Although
based in New York City, the geographical jurisdiction of the USCIT extends
nationwide, and its judges may conduct trials in federal courthouses located

227. See, e.g., Douglas H. Wilkins & Daniel I. Small, Arguing Dispositive Motions Remotely in
COVID Times, MASS. LAWS. WKLY. (July 23, 2020), https://www.hklaw.com//media/files/insights/publications/2020/07/arguing-dispositive-motions-remotely-in-covid-times—
massachusetts-law.pdf?la=he.
228. Ryan Davis, In a First, Game Controller Patent Case Kicks Off on Zoom, LAW360 (Jan.
25, 2021, 10:14 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/sports-and-betting/articles/1338857/in-a-firstgame-controller-patent-case-kicks-off-on-zoom.
229. Of the traditional justice and convenience factors, the ones most relevant for situating jury
trials by the specialized patent trial court include: ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process; cost of attendance for witnesses; practical considerations for trial; and local
interest. Cf. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (listing traditional
factors under Fifth Circuit law).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
231. John B. Pegram, Should There Be A U.S. Trial Court with A Specialization in Patent
Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 767 (2000); John B. Pegram, Should the
U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District
Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 72 (1995).

1172

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1137

anywhere in the United States.232 Notably, the USCIT is empowered by
statute to prescribe its own rules of practice and procedure.233 Although the
USCIT’s rules are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,234 it
has various rules that either have been tailored to accommodate 235 or are
unique to236 international trade cases. The USCIT’s rules are amended
through a process that includes a “public notice and comment stage based
upon recommendations of USCIT’s Advisory Committee on Rules”237 and
approval by the USCIT judges.238 Notably, the USCIT’s rules, and any
amendments thereto, do not go through the Federal Rules revision process
and are thus not transmitted to Congress,239 as that court has been given
“blanket authority by statute to promulgate its own rules.” 240 As such, the
USCIT’s process for amending its procedural rules is substantially more
streamlined than the process for amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which entails an elaborate, multi-year process involving the
Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress.241 More generally,
the USCIT’s ability to control its own rules of practice and procedure likely
provides it with greater flexibility to experiment than the district courts. For
example, it implemented a “Small Claims Pilot” in recent years “to test the
feasibility of a small claims process.”242

232. 28 U.S.C. § 256; About the Court, U.S. CT. OF INT’L TRADE,
https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/about-court (last visited June 19, 2021).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 2633(b) (“The Court of International Trade shall prescribe rules governing
the summons, pleadings, and other papers, for their amendment, service, and filing, for
consolidations, severances, suspensions of cases, and for other procedural matters.”).
234. See About the Court, supra note 232.
235. Compare USCIT R. 3, with FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
236. See, e.g., USCIT R. 56.1, 56.2, 56.3, 83.
237. JOSEPH I. LIEBMAN, 2 LAW AND PRACTICE OF U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE § 23:1 (2021).
238. See Notice Regarding USCIT
Rules,
U.S. CT. OF INT’L TRADE,
https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/notice-regarding-uscit-rules (last visited June 19, 2021) (“The official
rules and forms of the U.S. Court of International Trade are those reflected in the record of the
adoption of the rules and any amendments thereto as approved by the judges of the Court.”).
239. See Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Congress authorized the Court of International Trade to establish its own procedural rules, see 28
U.S.C. § 2633(b), and unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of International Trade’s
rules are not required to be transmitted to Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).”).
240. Yancheng Baolong Biochem. Prods. Co. v. United States, 406 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“[T]he Rules of the Court of International Trade are not promulgated subject to congressional
approval. The court is given blanket authority by statute to promulgate its own rules . . . .”).
241. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074; see also Pending Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. CTS.
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-and-forms-amendments (last visited June
19, 2021).
242. Small Claims Pilot, U.S. CT. OF INT’L TRADE, https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/small-claimspilot (last visited June 19, 2021).
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Like the USCIT, the specialized patent trial court would be empowered
to create its own rules of practice without going through the elaborate and
time-consuming Federal Rules revision process.243 This would allow the
proposed court to make timely (and, if necessary, iterative) rule changes to
tweak suboptimal procedural rules, keep up with the evolving tactics of
patent litigants, and conduct experiments and pilot programs. It is also
important that the creation of the rules of practice (and any subsequent
amendments) not require an act of Congress, which is susceptible to
lobbying.244 Material changes to the rules governing patent litigation (e.g.,
pleading, discovery) may be more likely to occur through a court tweaking
its rules of practice rather than through Congress, where many patent reform
bills have languished.245
Furthermore, as alluded to previously, trans-substantivity concerns may
be alleviated by virtue of the sandboxing effect provided by a specialized
court that has control over its own set of rules that are separate from the
Federal Rules.246 To be safe, it would be advisable to include in the relevant
statutory provision (and/or its legislative history) that grants the specialized
patent trial court its rule-promulgating powers an express indication that the
rules are intended to apply only in patent cases, without regard to transsubstantivity concerns.247 This express indication may be helpful because, in
all likelihood, the rules of practice and procedure used by the specialized
patent trial court might initially resemble the FRCP—assuming that the trial
judges are disinclined to create a new set of rules from scratch—from which
the rules would be successively amended and customized as necessary to
accommodate the idiosyncrasies of patent litigation. 248 The express
indication could dissuade the Supreme Court from striking down or undoing
a patent-idiosyncratic rule based on some perceived procedural norm
grounded in the FRCP.
In addition to reducing diagnostic confounders arising from variations
in the procedural rules, venue, and trial judge experience, a specialized patent
trial court could also reduce confounders arising from settlement-selection
effects by adopting rules and case management practices that make it more
likely that the merits—and hence issues of substantive patent law—will be
reached in a patent case. We may not know the extent to which certain
precedents are problematic because patent cases frequently settle (on the

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189‒194 and accompanying text.
See PATENT PROGRESS, supra note 4.
See infra Part II.B.
The Author thanks Joshua Sarnoff for this suggestion.
See supra notes 214–224 and accompanying text.

1174

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1137

order of 90% of the time)249 before they are invoked or tested on the merits.
As such, high rates of settlement—especially those that occur early in the
case—can impair the diagnosis and correction of suboptimal precedents. In
district courts, settlement is a key docket management tool that arises not
only from the uncertainty and expense of the litigation process, but also from
its active encouragement by judges.250 In a specialized patent trial court, it is
expected that settlement pressure may be less intense than in the district
courts. This is because a district court may have other matters that will need
to be prioritized over patent cases—for example, criminal cases pursuant to
the Speedy Trial Act251—which can lead to scheduling complications, delays
in adjudication, or other sources of settlement pressure in patent cases that
are exerted (intentionally or not) by district judges trying to manage their
dockets. By contrast, the docket of a specialized patent trial court would
consist of only one type of case—patent suits—which would allow case
management to become more standardized and streamlined, such that the
court might see fewer settlements while also becoming less reliant on them
to manage its docket. Accordingly, a specialized patent trial court could
make it more likely that the merits—and hence issues of substantive patent
law—will be reached. Decreasing settlement pressure that otherwise would
have prevented the merits from being adjudicated is important for diagnosing
and fixing problematic precedents—which, for some doctrines (e.g.,
patentable subject matter), may be a highly iterative process.
Although the idea of establishing a specialized patent trial court has
been proposed by multiple commentators, the diagnostic and changefacilitating benefits of such specialization have not been fully appreciated in
the literature. Rather, the existing justifications proffered for a specialized
court have focused primarily on improving the quality of adjudication, as
well as eliminating forum shopping at the trial-court level.252 For example,
there are suggestions in the literature that specialized trial judges might
adjudicate patent cases with greater efficiency and accuracy than
generalists;253 however, the evidence on this point is mixed, particularly on
249. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (“In any action, the court may order the attorneys and any
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes
as: . . . facilitating settlement.”).
251. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174; see also Leonidas Ralph Mecham, The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 Final Report, 175 F.R.D. 62, 89 (1997) (“A court’s criminal docket has
a direct impact on its civil docket. Criminal procedural requirements such as the Speedy Trial Act
and sentencing guidelines can be sources of delay in civil litigation. . . . Setting early and firm trial
dates is often difficult because of the precedence of criminal cases.”).
252. See supra notes 82‒83 and accompanying text.
253. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 71, at 444 (reporting results suggesting that “the impact on
the efficiency and accuracy of patent adjudication provides a real but modest case for the
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the issue of claim construction,254 as well as on the effectiveness of the Patent
Pilot Program at the half-way mark.255 Others have focused on whether the
Federal Circuit might accord greater deference to the decisions of a
specialized trial court256—thereby enhancing predictability—and temper its
habit of treating mixed questions of law and fact as issues of law subject to
de novo review,257 which the Federal Circuit currently uses to second-guess
generalist district judges.258 Relatedly, the Federal Circuit has also attracted
criticism for suboptimal precedents due to its preference for rigid, formalistic
rules,259 which, as noted by Rochelle Dreyfuss, ostensibly makes it easier for
generalist trial judges to apply the law consistently.260 In a similar vein, Peter
Lee observes that the Federal Circuit’s formalism may help reduce the
information costs for lay judges who adjudicate patent cases.261 In any event,
one implication of the existing literature is that if the trial judges were
specialized, the need (perceived or otherwise) for formalistic rules might be
reduced.262
By creating a controlled environment, a specialized patent trial court
would provide benefits that go beyond the existing theorized benefits relating

development of patent-specific judicial human capital at the trial level through the establishment of
a specialized patent trial court”).
254. See supra notes 176–187 and accompanying text.
255. See infra Part II.D.2.
256. See, e.g., Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 71, at 880 (“A single patent trial court
that had explicitly been given the imprimatur of authority over fact-finding would, in all likelihood,
compel greater deference than the current trial courts.”).
257. See id. at 879 (noting that the Federal Circuit has been “denominating questions that have
factual foundations—for example, mixed questions of law and fact such as claim construction—as
pure questions of law.”); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for
Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 266 (2015) [hereinafter
Dreyfuss, PTAB] (observing that “by classifying heavily technical issues as legal questions, the
court can review the district court’s resolution de novo”).
258. See Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 71, at 879 (“Given the trial courts’ lack of
familiarity with patent cases, the Federal Circuit’s suspicion of trial court decision-making, even on
factual issues, is understandable.”).
259. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
260. Dreyfuss, PTAB, supra note 257, at 266 (“[O]ne reason why the Federal Circuit tends to
create rules that the Supreme Court regards as overly ‘rigid’ may be that it is drawing bright lines
that nontechnical trial judges can apply with ease, thereby effectuating its perceived mandate to
ensure the uniform application of patent law.”).
261. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29 (2010) (“Federal Circuit
formalism is performing more work than initially meets the eye. . . . [T]his doctrinal methodology
helps reduce information costs associated with lay engagement with technology. In general,
formalism truncates and circumscribes legal inquiries, thus decreasing the extent to which lay judges
must engage technologically challenging subject matter.” (footnote omitted)).
262. See Dreyfuss, Identity, supra note 76, at 804 (“With confidence that the lower courts have
the technological capacity to follow its policies, the Federal Circuit would no longer need to
straightjacket their decisionmaking.”).
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to efficiency, accuracy, deference, and forum shopping. Specifically, a
specialized patent trial court could help localize and isolate problems in
patent litigation to allow for better diagnoses and faster adoption of targeted
fixes. Right now, patent litigation is conducted in federal district courts just
like other litigation. Accordingly, at the present time, patent law and patent
litigation cannot be fixed without fixing civil litigation in general—which
substantially increases the difficulty of achieving meaningful reforms.
D. Is it Really Necessary?
Given the suspicion of specialized courts in the literature,263 some may
ask whether it is truly necessary to set up a patent trial court in light of certain
developments within the past decade, such as the AIA post-issuance
proceedings at the PTAB and the Patent Pilot Program. I address each of
these in turn.
1. AIA Proceedings at the PTAB
Since their introduction in 2011, the AIA post-issuance proceedings264
(especially Inter Partes Review) have provided the public a low-cost
alternative to federal court litigation for challenging patents of questionable
validity, as well as those that are asserted (or likely to be asserted) in nuisance
suits. In the first few years after their introduction, the rate of invalidation in
these AIA proceedings was sufficiently high that the PTAB was dubbed a
“death squad” for patents.265 For this reason, some may be skeptical of the
need for additional reforms, such as setting up a specialized trial court.
But there is no guarantee that the PTAB’s challenger-friendly
performance will last: The PTO, as an executive agency led by a political
appointee, is susceptible to shifting priorities, which might also affect the
PTAB’s operation. Indeed, after Andrei Iancu’s appointment as Director of
the PTO in 2018,266 the agency instituted several reforms that have made the
post-issuance proceedings more patentee-friendly. For example, the claim
construction rule used by the PTAB has been changed from the “broadest
reasonable interpretation” (“BRI”) to the Phillips267 standard used in the

263. See infra Part III.
264. See supra notes 131‒133 and accompanying text.
265. See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360
(Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-nottotally-off-base-chief-says.
266. Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Andrei Iancu Begins Role as New Director of
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/newsupdates/andrei-iancu-begins-role-new-director-united-states-patent-and-trademark.
267. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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district courts,268 which is arguably not as loose as BRI, thus possibly making
it more difficult to prove invalidity using prior art.269 The agency also
introduced a pilot program that gives the patent owner more options for claim
amendments during post-issuance proceedings.270 But the most controversial
move by the agency thus far has been the push to deny institution of AIA
post-issuance proceedings on a discretionary basis based on the stage or
progress of parallel district court litigation.271 The discretionary denial
practice is grounded in a pair of PTAB decisions, NHK Spring Co. v. IntriPlex Technologies, Inc.272 and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,273 that have been
designated precedential with the approval of the PTO Director.274 In June
2020, some stakeholders wrote letters to Congress, alleging that such
discretionary denials have emboldened bad actors.275 In August 2020, a
group of technology companies sued the PTO to enjoin the application of the
NHK-Fintiv rule.276 Because an early district court trial date may increase
the likelihood of a discretionary denial, the PTAB’s NHK-Fintiv rule has
given rise to a further basis for forum shopping/selling that favors districts
that set early trial dates.277

268. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
269. IPR Petitions Spike On The Eve Of New Claim Construction Rules, IPWIRE (Nov. 13,
2018), http://ipwire.com/stories/ipr-petitions-spike-on-the-eve-of-new-claim-construction-rules/.
270. Notice Regarding a New Pilot Program Concerning Motion to Amend Practice and
Procedures in Trial Proceedings Under the America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 84 Fed. Reg. 9497 (Mar. 15, 2019).
271. See Dani Kass, Apple, Google Challenge IPR Discretionary Denial Precedent, LAW360
(Aug. 31, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1306002/apple-google-challenge-iprdiscretionary-denial-precedent [hereinafter Kass, IPR].
272. No. IPR2018-00752, 2018 WL 4373643 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018).
273. No. IPR2020-00019, 2020 WL 2126495 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020).
274. PTAB decisions are evaluated for designation as precedential by a Precedential Opinion
Panel, wherein “[n]o decision will be designated or de-designated as precedential or informative
without the approval of the Director.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Standard Operating
Procedure
2
(Rev.
10),
at
1,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf (last visited
June 19, 2021).
275. See Letter to House and Senate Judiciary Committees, at 1–2 (June 18, 2020),
https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2020/06/ipr-discretionary-denialletters538428483.pdf; see also Scott McKeown, Congress Urged to Investigate PTAB
Discretionary Denials, ROPES & GRAY: PATENTS POST-GRANT (June 30, 2020),
https://www.patentspostgrant.com/congress-urged-to-investigate-ptab-discretionary-denials/
(reporting on letters and linking to copies).
276. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Apple Inc. v. Iancu (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
2020) (No. 5:20-cv-06128-EJD); see also Kass, IPR, supra note 271.
277. See McKeown, supra note 275 (“The vast majority of discretionary denials . . . are favoring
aggressive trial schedules of Texas district courts.”).
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There are several ways the proposed specialized patent trial court can
ameliorate this situation. First, there would be no forum shopping/selling
based on the trial date because there would be a single forum, such that the
judges would be less inclined to set artificially early trial dates to attract
patentee-plaintiffs. Second, because the specialized patent trial court, as the
sole forum, would mitigate various diagnostic confounders, it may allow
lawmakers, stakeholders, and other interested observers to more clearly
discern the impact of the PTAB’s discretionary denials to determine whether
any legislative intervention might be necessary. Third, because the
specialized trial court would operate in a sandbox and be empowered to
promulgate its own rules, it can react faster than the district courts to amend
or iteratively tweak its procedural rules to mitigate the impact of a change in
PTAB operations that may embolden bad actors. And fourth, the singlevenue configuration of the specialized patent trial court could help mitigate
judge-to-judge coordination problems in applying a rule to remedy the
situation, which might be difficult to achieve with multiple district courts.
2. Patent Pilot Program
In 2011, Congress established a ten-year pilot program to enhance
patent case expertise among district judges (the “Patent Pilot Program”) with
the goal of improving patent case adjudication.278 Under the Patent Pilot
Program, district judges are given the option to decline patent cases, which
are then reassigned to designated “pilot judges” within their district who seek
to increase their patent litigation experience.279 However, an evaluation of
the Patent Pilot Program at the half-way mark (five years) suggests that
material improvements to patent case adjudication remain elusive: An
empirical study by Amy Semet reveals that, on appeal, “[p]ilot judges fare
no better than non-pilot judges, even when controlling for legal issues
addressed, procedural posture, and experience, among other variables.”280
This result is consistent with a separate empirical study conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center, which found that “pilot cases and nonpilot cases
[were] ‘correct’ at approximately the same rate [on appeal]—72% of the
time.”281
278. Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
279. Id. § 1(a)(1).
280. Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot
Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 519, 522
(2019).
281. MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, REBECCA EYRE & JOE CECIL, FED. JUD. CTR., PATENT PILOT
PROGRAM:
FIVE-YEAR
REPORT
36
(2016),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20FiveYear%20Report%20(2016).pdf. When the Federal Judicial Center gathered data for its study on
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One interpretation of these results could be that the Patent Pilot
Program, when measured half-way through its pilot period, has not yet had
the intended effect of materially improving trial court adjudication, as
measured by appellate outcomes. But another interpretation might be that
there were confounders that made it difficult to isolate the impact of
enhancing judicial experience in patent cases. As discussed previously, it
may be difficult to reliably control for district-to-district differences in the
applicable procedural rules (e.g., patent local rules) and case management
practices,282 especially given the substantial disparities in the volume of
patent cases among districts as well as among individual pilot judges.283
When comparing trial-level case dispositions between pilot and non-pilot
judges, Semet observed that the results materially changed based on whether
she included the Eastern District of Texas,284 whose judges disfavor granting
summary judgment285 and have generally adopted procedures that are highly
favorable to patentees in order to attract patent cases.286 As discussed earlier,
variations in procedure and case management practices, along with forum
shopping/selling, are likely confounders.287 Given that “[p]atent case filings
across various district courts are not a random sample,” Semet observes that
“[s]election effects . . . present[] the most concerning methodological
difficulty in analyzing the workings of the pilot program.”288 Semet adds that
“a better method could exist for analyzing case complexity—the variable that
would likely be the key confounding variable in this analysis in addition to
the selection effect issue.”289
It is not possible to know at this time whether the Patent Pilot Program
is actually making a difference, given the difficulty of isolating the effect of
increased expertise on patent case adjudication. The confounders Semet
encountered resemble some of those associated with the claim construction
studies discussed earlier, such as the difficulty of controlling for procedural

January 5, 2016, there were sixty-six “current” designated pilot judges, and an additional twentyfour judges who “previously served as designated judges but were not so designated as of January
5, 2016—most commonly as a result of leaving the bench.” Id. at 2.
282. See supra Part II.A.1.
283. See Semet, supra note 280, at 565–66.
284. Id. at 548.
285. See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 251 (“[J]udges in the Eastern District of Texas
grant summary judgment at less than one-quarter the rate of judges in other districts.”).
286. See id. at 250 (“[J]udges in the Eastern District have consciously sought to attract patentees
and have done so by departing from mainstream doctrine in a variety of procedural areas in a propatentee (pro-plaintiff) way.”).
287. See supra Part II.A.2.
288. Semet, supra note 280, at 575.
289. Id. at 574.
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variances and the nonrandom distribution of cases.290 Because the
specialized patent trial court would decrease both the number and the
magnitude of such confounders—which would improve the diagnostic power
of empirical studies—the inconclusive results of the Patent Pilot Program
lend further support to the proposed court. And, like the Patent Pilot
Program, the specialized patent trial court could be set up with an initial trial
period of ten years, renewable on satisfactory performance, if stakeholders
are wary of committing to a permanent court at its inception.
III. CAVEATS AND IMPLICATIONS
One might ask why greater specialization should be tolerated at the trial
level when the Federal Circuit has problems of its own that arise from
specialization, as amply documented in the literature.291 A related concern
may be that the proposed specialized patent trial court might aggravate
existing problems. Assuming that the Federal Circuit will remain as is for
the indefinite future, it is worth exploring how we can improve the existing
patent litigation landscape where we have a single appellate court in which
patent appeals are centralized. Accordingly, proposals to reform the Federal
Circuit itself, which are explored elsewhere in the literature,292 are beyond
the scope of this Article, which focuses on reforms at the trial court level.
Specifically, this Article uncovers a new, previously unappreciated role for a
specialized patent trial court—namely, as a mechanism for facilitating both
the diagnosis and treatment of problems in patent litigation, which has been
resistant to reforms. This is a departure from the literature, which has focused
almost exclusively on the role specialization might play in improving the
quality or accuracy of adjudication.
It is possible that the diagnostic and reform-facilitating benefits of
specialization at the trial court level—when aggregated with the quality- and
290. See supra Part II.A.3.
291. See supra notes 75–76 and infra notes 293–296 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. &
ENT. L. 197, 205 (2014) (proposing “staffing the Federal Circuit with district judges who serve
staggered terms of limited duration”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction,
100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1445 (2012) (“[R]eimagining the [Federal Circuit’s] nonpatent jurisdiction
could push patent law to better account for innovation concerns.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F.
Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (“We
propose that, in addition to the Federal Circuit, at least one extant circuit court should be allowed to
hear district court appeals relating to patent law.”); Lynda J. Oswald, Improving Federal Circuit
Doctrine Through Increased Cross-Pollination, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 284 (2017) (proposing that
“greater cross-pollination in patent doctrine” may be achieved by “requiring (1) Federal Circuit
judges to sit by designation in the regional circuits on a regular and frequent basis and (2) regional
circuit court judges to sit by designation in the Federal Circuit on a regular and frequent basis as
well”).
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accuracy-enhancing benefits predicted in the literature—could outweigh the
potential downsides of specialization, which include: the potential loss of
percolation (because a single trial court is being proposed);293 susceptibility
to capture;294 and tunnel vision 295 arising from the loss of the generalist
perspective.296 Given that these potential downsides are already applicable
to the Federal Circuit by virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals, it is worth considering whether a specialized subordinate court
would materially amplify them.297 Each of these concerns is addressed
below.
A. Impact on Percolation
Some may object to the proposal on the ground that restricting patent
cases to one trial court might make procedural experimentation difficult
because patent cases would be taken out of the district courts that can serve
as “laboratories.”298 A related concern might be that the percolation of
substantive patent law, which some commentators perceive as deficient in
light of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction,299 could be made even
more difficult under this proposal, given that the choice of venues for patent
case filings will shrink from ninety-four to just one. When percolation takes
the form of parallel experimentation, having multiple fora might be

293. See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 292, at 1675 (observing that the centralization of all
patent appeals at the Federal Circuit imposes “structural constraints that deprive the court of sistercircuit competition and a mechanism that would allow for incremental and tested innovations in the
law”); Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Promise
and Perils of A Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (“When
the Federal Circuit speaks, that becomes the nation-wide rule and in many cases, once it is spoken
there is less percolation, less chance for experimentation, less chance for what Justice Brandeis
called the ‘laboratory of federalism’ . . . .”).
294. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Case Study]; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court
Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543 (2018) [hereinafter Anderson, Court Capture] (explaining how
courts can be captured); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329, 345 (1991) (“The vulnerability of specialized adjudication to perceptions of capture is
partly due to the effects of a steady diet of subject matter and repeated advocacy from a single
source.”).
295. See Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 294, at 3.
296. See Bruff, supra note 294, at 331.
297. Cf. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 71, at 880 (“[A]lthough a single patent trial
court might be subject to the problems of capture and tunnel vision that potentially plague all
specialized courts, these problems should have less force at the trial level than at the appellate
level.”).
298. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J.
449, 451 (2010) (“Patent reform at the local level is dynamic as locales can serve as laboratories for
changes . . . .”).
299. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.

1182

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1137

convenient. But the presence of multiple fora invites forum shopping and
disuniformity in the application of the laws—two things that animated the
creation of the Federal Circuit in the first place.300
As explained previously,301 forum shopping and procedural
disuniformity may yield another problem: they can be diagnostic
confounders that make it difficult to evaluate whether a change in the law is
effective or works as intended, especially when litigants are able to avoid the
full impact of the law. Specifically, newly-enacted laws or new precedents
can be open to varying interpretations, such that if one district court acts early
and adopts an interpretation that allows the status quo to be largely preserved,
then plaintiffs who prefer the status quo may seek to circumvent the change
in the law by concentrating their filings in that district. 302 By contrast, with
a single, specialized patent trial court, it is possible to hold the trial forum
constant, thereby reducing venue-based confounders in assessing the impact
of a change in the law. However, when we have only one forum, we lose the
ability to have percolation among different courts. But how much percolation
would we actually lose?
It is not clear that the percolation that currently exists amongst the
district courts is of such high quality and sufficient quantity that it would
allow us to dismiss out of hand a serious look at a specialized trial court.
Indeed, the current system of patent litigation conducted in multiple district
courts may not actually be well-suited for percolation on certain issues
because forum shopping at the trial court level can distort it. In addition to
allowing plaintiffs to circumvent new laws, forum shopping may also cause
certain types of patent cases to be highly concentrated in certain jurisdictions,
which can limit the type of meaningful percolation that can aid in the
development of the law. For example, some district courts (e.g., E.D. Tex.,
N.D. Cal.) may have high concentrations of electronics and software patent
cases,303 while others (e.g., D. Del., D.N.J.) may attract pharmaceutical patent
cases,304 which may raise complex, arcane issues, such as FRAND
licensing305 and the Hatch-Waxman litigation framework,306 respectively,

300. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part II.A.2.
302. See supra Part II.A.2.
303. See Fromer, Patentography, supra note 66, at 1498 fig.1, 1499 tbl.1.
304. See id. at 1501 fig.3, 1502 tbl.2.
305. In general, patents that are essential to technical standards are to be licensed under terms
that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”). Abraham Kasdan & Michael J.
Kasdan, Recent Developments In The Licensing Of Standards Essential Patents, NAT’L L. REV.
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/recent-developments-licensing-standardsessential-patents-0.
306. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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that are seldom encountered in other district courts. As such, depending on
the issue, there may not be much percolation under the current system on a
district-to-district basis. That is, for cases of a certain type that are
disproportionally filed in just one or two districts, meaningful percolation is
likely to exist primarily on a judge-to-judge307 basis rather than on a districtto-district basis. For this reason, if all patent cases were filed in a single,
patent-specific trial court where the judges are assigned randomly to cases, it
is likely that the overall amount and quality of percolation (on a judge-tojudge basis)—on both substantive law and procedural issues—may not be
materially worse than what they are currently. On some issues, the quantity
of percolation might actually increase in a specialized patent trial court
because certain case types would no longer be concentrated among a few
judges (assuming that the total number of trial judges on the specialized court
is larger than this group). In addition, the quality of the judge-to-judge
percolation might actually improve not only because the cases would be
randomly assigned but also because each trial judge on a specialized patent
court would have a sophisticated understanding of patent law (as developed
from the concentration of patent cases in a single court). As Jeanne Fromer
has observed, one of the shortcomings of the current district courts that
impairs their ability to function as effective laboratories is that many district
judges lack a strong grasp of the intricacies of patent law.308
Furthermore, it might be easier in a specialized patent trial court to
formally institute percolation on some discrete procedural issue and compare
case outcomes between different groups of judges. That is, a single court can
easily serve as a controlled environment for testing or comparing procedural
options adopted by different groups of judges on that court, so long as the
assignment of judges is random. Compared to multiple district courts—each
having a different mix of cases, judges, and idiosyncrasies—a single patent
trial court is likely to have fewer coordination problems when conducting
pilot programs or other experiments.309

307. Judge-to-judge percolation would occur not only because of potential district-to-district
variations in the procedural rules but also through the natural variation in how trial judges exercise
discretion in applying a common set of rules. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look
at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2007) (observing that “most
discretionary decisions take place within some guidelines, principles, or constraints”).
308. Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 307, 315–
16 (2011).
309. The literature suggests several potential areas for experimentation by the courts, including:
claim construction, trial dynamics, fee shifting, and defenses. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent
Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 110 (2015).
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B. Susceptibility to Capture
In evaluating whether the proposed patent trial court might be
susceptible to capture,310 it may be instructive to look at the experience of the
Federal Circuit because the litigants in patent-related appeals will largely
correspond to those in the proposed specialized patent trial court. As noted
by Jonas Anderson, the Federal Circuit is “a capture target” that “enjoys the
attention of nearly every patent attorney in the land.”311 Although there is no
definitive answer on whether the Federal Circuit has actually been captured,
many scholars—for a variety of reasons—do not believe it has been.312 John
Golden, for example, is skeptical of the contention that the patent bar has
captured the Federal Circuit, because, given the patent bar’s heterogeneous
nature, “interests plausibly ascribed to the patent bar can be used to explain
virtually any shift in the law, regardless of its direction.”313 Arti Rai observes
that while certain pro-patent tendencies of the Federal Circuit (e.g., viewing
patents as ordinary property) might be suggestive of capture, “they do
not . . . represent dispositive evidence of capture,”314 particularly when
viewed in a broader context with its other precedents (e.g., written
description, doctrine of equivalents) that restrict the scope of patent rights.315
Along these lines, Rochelle Dreyfuss credits “[t]he presence of strong
repeat players on both sides of the issues [as having] permitted the CAFC to
escape allegations of capture.”316 Indeed, patent litigators at some of the
largest firms often have both patentees and accused infringers as clients. In
addition, the major stakeholders in the patent system have differing views on
the appropriate scope of patent rights: the pharmaceutical industry will seek
stronger patent protections, whereas the software and consumer electronics
industries will often seek to rein in abusive assertions.317 Furthermore, it is
not uncommon for a large company to appear as a plaintiff in one case and

310. Capture theory has its origin in studies of regulatory agencies: “Traditionally, capture is
thought to occur when an agency becomes too cozy with an industry that it regulates.” Anderson,
Court Capture, supra note 294, at 1545. “[W]hen . . . institutional safeguards break down, federal
courts are exposed to capture in much the same manner as . . . federal agencies . . . .” Id. at 1547.
311. Id. at 1572 (emphasis omitted).
312. See J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern
District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1616–18 (2018) (surveying the literature).
313. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 685 (2009) [hereinafter Golden,
Percolator].
314. Rai, Engaging Facts, supra note 171, at 1112.
315. Id. at 1112–13.
316. Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 294, at 71.
317. See supra notes 79‒80 and accompanying text.
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as a defendant in another.318 As Mark Janis notes, “patent enforcement
litigation is inherently balanced, and this inherent balance discourages
capture.”319 This is in line with Dreyfuss’s conclusion that the “skepticism
towards specialized courts [that] has been bred by the experience of the Tax
Court (which is sometimes viewed as the government’s court) or the
Commerce Court (which was doomed by its perceived disposition in favor of
railway owners) . . . may be misdirected when leveled at the CAFC.”320 The
notion that a specialized court may be more resistant to capture if there are
sophisticated litigants on both sides is also illustrated by the Delaware
Chancery Court, which, according to Dreyfuss, is a court where “the costs of
specialization seem minimal.”321 She notes that “a corporation making a
tender offer in one transaction may be fighting one in the next deal, giving it
little incentive to bias the judges in favor of one particular view on any issue
of tender offer law.”322 If the existence of strong, repeat players on both sides
helps the Federal Circuit avoid capture, then this rationale should also apply
to the proposed specialized patent trial court.
More generally, it is not entirely clear that specialization, in and of itself,
should be the central focus when evaluating the potential for judicial capture.
This is because courts that arguably show signs of capture at the trial level
include both specialized courts (e.g., the bankruptcy courts)323 and generalist
courts (e.g., the Eastern District of Texas).324 Notably, in both the bankruptcy
courts and the Eastern District of Texas, the behaviors that suggest capture
are similar: the judges, for various reasons,325 endeavor to attract a certain
type of case, so they engage in forum selling by crafting procedural rules,
case management practices, and rulings that make their courts attractive to
the party that chooses the court.326 As Jonas Anderson observes, “the specter
of court capture likely cannot be eliminated,” but “limit[ing their] ability to
318. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 399 (2001).
319. Id. at 400.
320. Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 294, at 29–30.
321. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995).
322. Id. at 22.
323. LOPUCKI, supra note 126, at 19–21 (describing cozy relationship with local bankruptcy bar
and professional benefits that accrue from presiding over high-profile cases).
324. Anderson, Court Capture, supra note 294, at 1551 (arguing that “there are some indications
that the [Eastern District of Texas] has been captured by special interests,” such as a revolving door
between the federal bench and the local bar, as well as substantial economic benefits that accrue to
the local community from the influx of patent suits).
325. In comparing the bankruptcy courts with the Eastern District of Texas, Klerman and Reilly
observe that their “motives to attract cases were remarkably similar: increased status and power for
the judges and more business for local lawyers.” Klerman & Reilly, supra note 54, at 293.
326. See id. at 292‒93.
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attract cases . . . makes courts far less appealing as targets of capture . . . .”327
Because the proposed specialized trial court will be the sole trial venue for
patent cases, it may be less susceptible to the type of judicial capture seen in
the Eastern District of Texas and the bankruptcy courts.
C. Impact on Precedents
Another concern might be that trial-level specialization could
substantially reduce the generalist influence in patent case adjudication,
potentially leading to tunnel vision.
One way to mitigate the loss of the generalist perspective would be to
recruit the judges for the specialized court not from the patent litigation bar
but instead from the existing population of district judges and regional circuit
judges. It is contemplated that those judges would serve on the specialized
trial court on a full-time basis for an indefinite duration—that is, they would
be appointed to a new federal court. If it is desirable to further guard against
the loss of the generalist perspective, those judges could serve full-time on
the patent trial court for a set number of years and return to their previous
duty stations in the federal judiciary, and other federal judges would rotate in
on a regular, staggered basis. A rotation system would be feasible because,
as previously discussed, the judges of the specialized patent trial court need
not be housed in a single physical location and all pretrial proceedings may
be handled remotely or on the papers.328 It is important that a judge serves
full-time on the patent trial court during their service period—as opposed to
a part-time arrangement like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court329—
to eliminate potential diagnostic confounders that may arise from docket
management pressures created by non-patent cases (especially criminal
cases).330 The primary caveat with a rotation system would be that the
specialized patent trial court would regularly lose its most experienced
judges.
Apart from concerns about the loss of the generalist perspective, the
unease with having two-levels of specialization may also lie in the current
suboptimal practices of the Federal Circuit that arise from its semispecialized status, such as formalism and insufficient deference to trial court
fact-finding.331 But it is worth noting that some of the Federal Circuit’s
327. Anderson, Court Capture, supra note 294, at 1551.
328. See supra Part II.C.
329. About the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FOREIGN INTEL. SURVEILLANCE CT.,
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court (“Judges typically sit
for one week at a time, on a rotating basis.”) (last visited June 19, 2021).
330. See supra notes 250‒251 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 75 and 256‒258 and accompanying text.
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problematic tendencies might actually be artifacts of its review of generalist
trial judges instead of specialists. 332 It is possible, then, that specialization at
the trial court level could moderate some of the Federal Circuit’s suboptimal
behaviors in patent case adjudication.
In addition, the proposed specialized trial court, by virtue of being in a
procedural sandbox,333 may be freer than the district courts to experiment
with procedural rules that can compensate for suboptimal Federal Circuit
precedents. Patent litigation is sufficiently complex such that there may be
uncertainty as to whether some problem is grounded in a procedural rule,
substantive patent law, or some combination thereof. When faced with such
a problem, the specialized patent trial court can engage in an iterative cycle
of diagnosis and treatment by successively tweaking its procedural rules and
observing the results, which can lead to either: (1) material progress in
resolving the problem if the underlying cause was primarily procedural; or
(2) a revelation that the underlying cause is likely an artifact of suboptimal
substantive law, which could inform the Federal Circuit as to the necessity of
revising its precedents.
With respect to the development of substantive patent law precedents, a
related concern might be that a specialized trial court might allow the Federal
Circuit to further tighten its grip over patent law in undesirable ways.334 But,
could such a trial court instead serve as a counterweight? Since its creation,
the Federal Circuit’s dominant influence in the patent system has come at the
expense of Congress335 and the PTO.336 In recent years, however, some
scholars have observed that the PTAB has reclaimed some of the influence
over the development of patent law from the Federal Circuit. Because the
PTAB is a specialized patent tribunal from which appeals are heard by the
Federal Circuit,337 it may provide clues about the potential dynamics between
the proposed specialized trial court and the Federal Circuit in the
development of substantive patent law precedents.
The PTAB emerged as a major player in patent law when, in 2011, the
AIA empowered it to hear adversarial validity challenges to issued patents,

332. See supra notes 256–261 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Identity, supra note 76, at 804 (“Two levels of specialized courts
would . . . likely produce law that is substantially out of the mainstream.”).
335. Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Specialization, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2511, 2531 (2019) (“By
engaging in quasi-legislative behavior and lobbying for Congress to stay out of patent law, the
Federal Circuit takes away Congress’s need to act and deprives the public of deliberative
lawmaking.”).
336. Id. at 2530 (“From the outset, the Federal Circuit disregarded the APA and used its expertise
to undercut the PTO’s delegated policymaking and fact-finding authority.”).
337. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
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such as Inter Partes Review.338 The PTAB judges, who have backgrounds in
both patent law and a technical field,339 conduct the AIA proceedings in a
manner that, at times, resembles litigation in a trial court.340 One of the ways
that the PTAB may be able to influence the development of patent law is
through what Rochelle Dreyfuss describes as its “preview capacity,”341 in
which the PTAB “is likely to be among the first to implement new Supreme
Court pronouncements.”342 In other words, the PTAB, as a subordinate
tribunal (relative to the Federal Circuit), will often have the first shot at
substantively grappling with new patent law precedents.343 This preview
capacity, when exercised by the patent-savvy PTAB judges, has led Dreyfuss
to conclude that “the PTAB could provide the Federal Circuit with a partner
in the enterprise of interpreting patent law and implementing Supreme Court
decisions”344—especially recent ones that the Federal Circuit might struggle
with,345 such as Nautilus346 and Alice.347 In addition, given the volume of
proceedings it handles,348 the PTAB would encounter certain issues more
frequently than the Federal Circuit (because only a subset of proceedings are
appealed), thereby giving the former a “repeat player” advantage in making
sense of new precedents.349 John Golden observes that “the post-issuance
proceedings administered by the PTAB indeed do much to enhance” the
PTO’s potential as patent law’s “prime-mover,” which is “the government

338. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319.
339. Id. § 6 (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge
and scientific ability . . . .”).
340. The PTO characterizes the AIA proceedings as “trials,” and has published a trial practice
guide for practitioners that provides guidance on matters such as discovery, live testimony, motion
practice, oral hearings, and settlement. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., CONSOLIDATED TRIAL
PRACTICE GUIDE, at i–v, 1 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated.
341. Dreyfuss, PTAB, supra note 257, at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. Id. at 240.
343. See id. at 261–62.
344. Id. at 240.
345. See id. at 261–62.
346. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
347. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
348. For example, in Fiscal Year 2019, the PTAB processed 1,641 petitions for AIA
proceedings, of which 840 were instituted, yielding 551 Final Written Decisions (FWD). MICHAEL
TIERNEY & WILLIAM SAINDON, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., BOARDSIDE CHAT: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS
7
(2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PTAB_boardside_chat_new_trial_stats_sas_a
nd_operational_faqs_06_11_2020.pdf.
349. See Dreyfuss, PTAB, supra note 257, at 261–62 (observing that while the Federal Circuit
in Nautilus “was having a very difficult time coming up with a workable approach,” the PTAB’s
“[r]epeated exposure to definiteness problems in CBMs (and eventually in PGRs) [has led] to the
development of nuanced and context-specific standards”).
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body that is likely to be the first to address many patent law issues in a
centralized and systematic fashion.”350
Like the PTAB, the judges on the proposed specialized patent trial court
will be experts in patent law, and will handle a high volume of cases.351 And
when new precedents emerge—whether from the Supreme Court or the
Federal Circuit—the proposed specialized patent trial court’s subordinate
position in the adjudicatory hierarchy, along with the centralization of all
patent cases in that court, will provide it with opportunities to explore and
apply new precedents sooner and more often than the Federal Circuit. This
combination of expertise, “preview capacity,” and case concentration—traits
that the proposed specialized patent trial court shares with the PTAB—may
allow it to serve as a counterweight to the Federal Circuit in the development
of patent law. It may be the case that this dynamic, where a trial court and
the Federal Circuit would influence each other, is more likely to exist where
the trial court shares the Federal Circuit’s expertise. That is, it may take a
specialized court to successfully take on a specialized court.
Relatedly, this preview capacity at the trial level may be best executed
if there is a single court that sees a variety of cases, which could potentially
counteract what Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have observed as the
technological-specificity of Federal Circuit precedents.352 Venue reform
proposals that tie venue to some characteristic of the accused infringer (e.g.,
principal place of business, market, etc.) may result in technological
clustering of patent cases in certain districts (e.g., software cases in the
Northern District of California, pharmaceutical cases in the District of New
Jersey). Although such clustering might allow the judges of a particular
district to develop expertise in a particular technology, it might also aggravate
the balkanization of substantive patent law by industry or technology, which,
in some cases, could lead to suboptimal results (assuming that we want to
maintain a unitary patent system). Compared to trial judges who are exposed
to a limited universe of technologies, judges who preside over cases that
present a greater variety of technologies may be in a better position to craft a
balanced rule that is workable across most technologies. This is one of the
things that the Federal Circuit is presently struggling with, particularly in
relation to its patentable subject matter case law, which, according to some

350. John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO As Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657,
1691–92 (2016).
351. 3,347 new patent cases were filed in the district courts in 2019. 2019 Patent Dispute
Report-Year
in
Review,
fig.1,
UNIFIED
PATS.
(Jan.
1,
2020),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2019/12/30/q4-2019-patent-dispute-report.
352. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155 (2002).
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observers, has been a positive development for the software industry, but has
been a poor fit for the life sciences industry.353
If there were a specialized patent trial court that was the sole trial venue,
it would be exposed to just as much (or greater) technological variety as the
Federal Circuit, such that the trial court’s “preview function” could be more
helpful in later shaping the appellate court’s thinking on crafting a rule that
can work across different technologies. This is because the burden of crafting
a suitable trans-technological rule would no longer fall on the Federal Circuit
in the first instance, but would also be picked up by the trial court by virtue
of handling a technologically-varied docket. For this reason, the “preview
function” provided by a trial court that has a docket with a high concentration
of a certain type of technology might be less helpful.
Finally, it is difficult to predict whether any problems that might arise
with a specialized patent trial court will necessarily be materially worse than
what exists currently. However, the problems that do arise might be
diagnosed more accurately. This is because confounders that would have
frustrated accurate diagnoses might be substantially mitigated by virtue of
having a single patent trial court that reduces the number of variables and/or
their range in patent litigation. In addition, the sandboxing effect will make
it more likely that a working solution can be implemented. Thus, when
Congress or the Supreme Court intervenes in response to a crisis in patent
law that arises after the implementation of the specialized patent trial court,
the reforms they hand down may be more likely to hit the mark. In short,
establishing a patent trial court could make it less likely that a crisis will be
wasted.354 By contrast, under the current regime that uses generalist district
courts, problematic practices and precedents may evade or frustrate reforms
due to confounding variables and coordination problems. This may leave
patent law stuck in a state of persistent—and resilient—suboptimality.355
CONCLUSION
Over the past several decades, reforms and changes in the law have had
little effect in materially improving patent litigation. This reflects the
difficulty of predicting how the patent litigation ecosystem would react to
attempts at reform because it has too many moving parts—which can obscure
353. Pharmaceutical and Software Industries at Odds on Potential Section 101 Reform,
LATHAM & WATKINS (May 15, 2017), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/pharmaceuticalsoftware-industries-potential-section-101-reform.
354. The quote “never let a good crisis go to waste” has been variously attributed to Machiavelli,
Winston Churchill, and, more recently, Rahm Emanuel.
355. See Golden, Percolator, supra note 313, at 674 (warning against the “danger of sticky
suboptimality”).
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the true nature, scope, and underlying causes of some of its most intractable
problems. As a result, there is a good chance that some change in the law
that is introduced to solve such problems may end up missing the mark or
falling short in some way. As one possible solution, this Article proposes
setting up a specialized patent trial court that is empowered to promulgate its
own rules of practice and procedure, which could serve as a controlled
adjudicatory environment where diagnostic confounders can be mitigated
and reforms can be iteratively fine-tuned.

